



Review: Comparative Government and Politics
Source: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 1307-1343
Published by: [American Political Science Association](#)
Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1958384>
Accessed: 14/11/2010 10:03

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some of the assumptions and inferences to tests of disproof.—R. E. JOHNSTON, *Wayne State University*.

Campaigns: Cases in Political Conflict. By WALT ANDERSON. (Pacific Palisades: Goodyear Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 242. \$6.95.)

Case studies of significant national and state political campaigns are excellent material for understanding as well as for teaching when authors do their homework on the superabundance of available information and without naivete about the realities of political life. But this volume fails to relate in depth the campaigns to yesterday or today.

The good guys ride white horses in stereotyped silhouettes. The author imagines that many candidates smeared as Socialists by opponents are really such and is sure that only "radical theorists" think labor and farmer are allies. Presidential primaries did not diminish because of the disillusionment of idealists but because of their inconvenience to political machines. The reader does not discover the calculated ambivalence of Lincoln's 1858 statements on race nor that a change of 1 in 1,000 votes would have cost him both presidential elections. Bryan and La Follette are replaced by Theodore Roosevelt as the Progressive leader and Pershing's black cavalry at San Juan Hill in front of TR is only one of the missing ingredients of the TR story. La Follette is accused of being a dictator, though TR is not, and is slandered with the resurrected legend that the Wisconsin Progressive was unbalanced because he criticized newspaper publishers to their faces. After LBJ, can TR be "the most energetic president"? Needless superficial are the Kennedy and Nixon chapters and to conclude that the religious issue was buried in 1960 is to misread a close election and to forget that New

York has had no Catholic governor since 1928. Also omitted is the understanding that the 1960 McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire was a facsimile of the 1952 Kefauver race, triggered by a blunder of the same presidential assistant and dependent on Republican finance as well as publicity.

Skimmed over the surface also are state campaigns, with serious omissions and errors. Wade Hampton was not chief of Confederate cavalry nor Benjamin Tillman a possible presidential nominee, though his sparking primaries over the nation is almost ignored. The "composite" picture of Senator Millard Tydings, Sr., and Communist Earl Browder is not clearly identified as a fraud; and also unstressed by the author who makes the San Fernando Valley his home is the management of the smear campaign against Upton Sinclair by Earl Warren. Pumpkin papers are swallowed as uncritically as the La Guardia legend. Is it correct that "Reagan's chief interest in college was the student body"? Callaway Gardens is not in Columbus, Ga.; and Carter did not lack for outside finance. And missing from the account of the Lester Maddox and "Bo" Callaway campaign are many stories of interest, such as Lester's "Do you want a man for governor who never had to look for a job, never had to read the want ads, never had to wait for a pay check, never had to buy on the installment plan, never had to put off buying anything?", along with a former governor's pleading "There is a lot of difference between a man who knows better and one who doesn't," and the letter in the *Atlanta Constitution* "To Avoid BO, use Lestherine."

When Alfred Tennyson wrote of "the fairy tales of science," he did not envisage political science.—CHARLES G. HAMILTON, *Aberdeen, Miss.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

L'Organizzazione Partitica del PCI e della DC. By F. CERVELLATI CANTELLI, V. CIONI POLACCHINI, P. DE VITO PISCICELLI, S. GUARINO CAPPELLO, G. POGGI, G. SANI, G. SIVINI, A. SIVINI CAVAZZANI, a cura di Gianfranco Poggi. Istituto "Carlo Cattaneo," Vol. II, Ricerche sulla Partecipazione Politica in Italia (Bologna: il Mulino, 1968. Pp. 591.)

No one interested seriously in Italian party politics should go very long without reading this book, the second volume in a series focussed on political parties and participation produced by the noted Carlo Cattaneo Institute of Bologna. A while ago, an Italian political scientist complained that empirical studies of Italian politics seemed to come mainly from foreigners. The authors who contribut-

ed to the three sections of this new volume have done much to overcome this imbalance. Using varied, and, in the main, effective tools of analysis, they approach the internal life of the two major Italian parties—the Communists and Christian Democrats—from three different standpoints: organization, mass membership and leadership. They come up with a product that is part exposition of research findings and insights, and part compendium of basic background data for the study of political parties in Italy.

The section devoted to the organizational life of the two parties, prepared by Giacomo Sani and Stefania Guarino Cappello, demonstrates how a thorough analysis of the party literature and documentation, carried out by a scholar with a real

sense for complex organizations, can make an important contribution to an understanding of party behavior. (This is more true of the Communists, who have produced a body of documentation immensely richer and more descriptive of their organization than have the Christian Democrats). The chapter by Sani on the PCI as an organizational system shows both the genius for synthesis that is characteristic of Italian scholarship at its best and a thorough empirical grounding, something often lacking in work by Italian scholars. The synthetic chapter on the DC is, in contrast, disappointing, as is the absence in this hefty essay of any real framework of comparison. For instance, much of the evidence collected on the PCI suggests that its organizational problems are universal (and not uniquely Leninist) and result from its leaders' self-conscious decision to work within the political system as legitimate participants. Some of the same problems seem to afflict the DC, but in the absence of an explicit comparative framework, it is hard to know exactly how similar the difficulties of the two parties are.

Explicit comparison is one of the major virtues of the section on the two parties' mass membership, a statistical and historical analysis by Giordano Sivini and Ada Cavazzani. (A fourth aspect—the activists—appears in a separate volume, *L'Attivista di Partito*, edited by Francesco Alberoni). In this section, some standard aspects of organizational sociology—the number, composition and consistency of the registered members, the relationship of members to voters, the rather special problems of organizing among the young and the female—are treated with both the historical flair that is traditional in Italian scholarship and with a statistical finesse that will serve many a future scholar with a precious resource. With all that, the section has less of a theoretical structure than the first, and one somehow feels that more might have been done with the material in the way of inference and interpretation. Sivini does do more in a later article, and there is much promise of more to come from his direction in the study of political parties.

The third section of the book, contributed by Gianfranco Poggi and Vittoria Cioni Polacchini, examines the whole topography of the "classe dirigente" of the parties. The Italians have contributed this term to the world. They are never without skill in probing the phenomenon, as Poggi shows in his theoretical introduction. But the treatment of the statistical data, drawn from questionnaires collected from parliamentarians and organizational leaders of both parties, adds little to the standard presentation of background, recruitment and career pattern variables that have become a standard implement of political sociology. Moreover, and here we anticipate a general criticism of the

volume, the research on the leadership of the two parties is not at all related to the two previous sections of the book, with the result that the overall impression is of three strata of analysis, all obviously interdependent, but presented in airtight packages.

There are several reasons for this general defect. First, as Poggi tells us in the general introduction, in the planning of the larger project, the Cattaneo Institute allocated "a maximum of autonomy" to the participants. But, second, the problem is compounded by the fact that the work in this volume was divided into concrete, rather than analytical, slices. Thus organizational history from 1946 to 1963 is treated in two different guises, but the *process* of decision-making within the organization falls between everybody's stools. This most critical aspect of organization ought really to have integrated the volume, and in its absence, the overall impression of the volume is more of a source book on Italian party organization than of a report on five years of Cattaneo Institute research.

A second basic problem, already alluded to above, is the lack of an overall conceptual framework to inform the work, not only of these authors, but of the Cattaneo participation series as a whole. One must be satisfied with a rather broad inventory of "meanings" of the term "participation" in the general introduction, but the term has no fundamental role in the general strategy of this series of volumes. Paradoxically, then, *L'Organizzazione Partitica del PCI e della DC* is weak where Italian scholarship has generally been strong—in general theory and in the elaboration of a conceptual apparatus—while it excels in the solid empirical grounding that foreigners have sometimes found weak in Italian political writings. Whatever the cause, the fault does not lie with the authors of this volume, who have carried out the tasks assigned to them supremely well.—SIDNEY TARROW, *Yale University*.

Le vestali della classe media: Ricerca sociologica sugli insegnanti. BY MARZIO BARBAGLI AND MARCELLO DEI. (Bologna: il Mulino, 1969. Pp. 373. L4.000.)

Most American political scientists are unfamiliar with the degree of theoretical and methodological sophistication now extant among Italian social scientists. This impression has persisted despite laudable efforts to correct it by such scholars as Joseph LaPalombara, Sidney Tarrow and Samuel Barnes. Several recent volumes published by *il Mulino*, one of which is reviewed here, should do much to demonstrate that the work of Italian scholars can be neglected only at considerable intellectual cost. In this connection one should note the following titles; Giorgio Galli (ed.), *Il comportamento elettorale in Italia*, Gianfranco Poggi (ed.), *L'organiz-*

zazione partitica del PCI e della DC; Francesco Alberone (ed.), *L'attivista di partito* and Agopik Manoukian (ed.), *La presenza sociale del PCI a della DC*.

Le vestali della classe media by Marzio Barbagli and Marcello Dei is one of the volumes which should not escape notice. The authors are generally concerned with investigating the relationship between public policy, in this case educational reform, and the Italian system of social stratification. In particular they focus on the impediments to governmental reforms aimed at enlarging the social composition of the *scuola media*. They suggest that the primary source of resistance originates with the teachers and principals who fundamentally oppose reform and are openly hostile to students from the lower classes. Moreover they observe that the teachers reinforce the prevailing social structure by rewarding values of passivity and obedience rather than independence and creativity.

In order to test these insights, these scholars construct a complex research design through which to investigate the phenomenon in question; namely resistance to change in the school. They ground their inquiry in a large body of survey data. These data consist of lengthy interviews with 374 teachers, 200 parents of students and 328 mail questionnaires completed by school principals. The interviews were conducted between 1966 and 1968 in Florence, Bologna, Pistoia and Arezzo.

The volume's four chapters draw heavily on these interviews yet each reveals a neat mesh between theory and data. Chapter one focuses on the sociological configuration of the teaching profession in order to bring into sharp relief the social structure of the new *scuola media*. The authors present a number of interesting findings concerning entrance into the profession, professional satisfaction, and the relationship between perceptions of professional prestige and status insecurity. Chapter two employs a multi-variate approach to explain the central phenomenon of resistance to change in the schools. Chapter three concerns the attitudes of teachers towards sex education as predictors of their general resistance to change and as an indicator of their unwillingness to engage in genuine intellectual exchanges with the students. Chapter four brings the whole volume together by examining the changing role of the teacher in Italian society and the attitudes of parents and principals toward the role. The chapter also contains important evidence on the propensity of teachers to socialize the students to subordinate roles. Finally, there is a methodological appendix and a copy of the instruments used in the interviews.

The findings of chapters two and four are of most interest to the political scientist. The first rigorously isolates the causes of resistance to

change in the schools via the construction of four Guttman scales which are entitled as follows: 1) Resistance to Change; 2) Personal Rigidity; 3) Authoritarian Teacher; 4) Political Conservatism. Age and the profession of the father are also considered. The Simon-Blalock causal modeling technique is used to sort out the most acceptable models for male and female teachers. Among the men the most powerful predictors of resistance to change are political conservatism and social background, while among the women the most important factor is political conservatism in combination with age. The fact that resistance to change is rooted in political conservatism is indeed a significant finding and should serve to stimulate further research along these lines.

In chapter four, Barbagli and Dei make a largely convincing case for their proposition that most of the teachers in the *scuola media* use the sanctions of their profession to control political and social deviants. Their case would have been even stronger, however, if they had gathered data on *student* perceptions of the restrictive nature of the teachers behavior, instead of making inferences about "socialization to subordination" on the basis of data from parents, teachers and administrators.

In sum, the volume is an extremely important contribution to our understanding of the attitudinal and societal features of the Italian teachers' role which tend to reinforce mechanisms of societal exclusion and impede public policy intended to democratize the Italian political system.—TIMOTHY M. HENNESSEY, *Michigan State University*.

Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development. EDITED BY COLIN LEYS. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 289. \$7.50.)

A collection of nine papers from a 1968 conference at the University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies with introduction by the editor, now of University College, Nairobi. All are about development; all are by Britons; all are eminently scholarly. Some are genuinely interesting to developmentists, either because they put part of the field into excellent perspective or because they suggest interesting approaches or avenues of research. A large bibliographical index is useful.

Leys, who has encouraged many young students of development, sympathizes with those who have suffered ". . . the outpouring in recent years of collections of papers in the social sciences"—the ". . . things in books' clothing. . . ." Defensively, he argues that this collection is more—that, in it, is achieved a synthesis of English traditions of historical empiricism and political theory with American behavioralism, seen as Parsonian sociology carried to excess.

The book's contents do tell us something about movement in British political science, but they do not demonstrate the emergence of a neo-classical synthesis or rebirth of theory. The thread Leys finds to link them into a book is weak; the essays must be judged separately.

Robert Dowse's essay on the *military* and development is an excellent, scholarly account of what we know, what we don't and why, and what we should do now. The field is cramped by militaries' dislike of being researched and by the vagueness of our categories. The latter has affected that part of the field academics have concentrated on—coups. We have largely neglected how the military acts once in power, its political influence when not in control, and even the social background of its members. The author reviews the results of factor analysis—an effective Occam's Razor even with sparse and dubious data, but does not provide the needed “good theory at the right level of generality.” An able discussion of the Ghanaian military illustrates some of his ideas.

Morris-Jones neatly situates the concept of *political recruitment*, as yet little used in less-developed countries, and reviews its utility—both sufficiently general and sufficiently precise (more so than mobilization, for instance). He notes that the term implies the selecting agency's exclusive initiative, which is hardly the case. Much can be learned about development, he suggests, by widening the study of recruitment (entry?) through work on 1) typical career routes (via biographies), 2) aspiration patterns (which sorts of people are clamoring to be recruited and which are not, and 3) catchment areas (a category less clearly explained).

When Morris-Jones studies recruitment of members of the Indian parliament and state legislative assemblies, one has to agree that use of the concept to elucidate development politics is just beginning.

Feldman examines the consistency of *Tanzanian agricultural modernization* with the government's cooperative *ujamaa* ideal. His empirical base is narrow: his wife's work with 49 tobacco farmers and P. H. Gulliver's on Nyakusa land tenure. Nevertheless, the generalizations are convincing (and devastating for the *ujamaa* ideal) and the conceptual framework, full of promise for future research on rural change.

Instead of asking whether local society is resistant to social disturbance, Feldman looks at the *economic stress* imposed on traditional ways by new development options, i.e. the cost of not changing. That cost measures loyalty to traditional patterns and explains selective adoption of innovation.

In commercial agriculture, the economic stress of cooperative management is found to be high;

ujamaa organization declines with modernization. Social stratification has not yet appeared, because land is a free good; hired laborers are not proletarianized, but labor by choice and have access to land. Growth of population and commercial agriculture, however, will create land scarcities and stratification.

Alec Nove's lucid article on *Soviet development* and political organization contains little that he hasn't said before. It is interesting nonetheless, and refreshingly free from footnotes. Nove traces the victory of “teleological” over “genetic” planning, culminating in Stalinist centralized growth policy. He is careful to count the economic costs of terror, of the primacy of politics, and of a pricing system in which planners could not calculate alternative costs. He suggests how the results might have been bought more cheaply, but recognizes that Russians were plowing a new furrow and that it is illusory to believe that high Russian rates of accumulation could have been achieved without severe repression.

The article is on the margin of this collection. Nove admits that 1918 Russia was not the low-income countries of today, saying only that all countries are unique and Russia's experience is one source of lessons. Other articles, like Feldman's and Vincent's, emphasize the limited administrative capabilities of today's less-developed countries and their distance from Soviet experience.

Colin Leys points to the lamentable consequences of letting economists do all the writing about *planning*. What planners actually do is not—probably could not be—the “synoptic” process Tinbergen describes. Business-firm management furnishes the closest analogy to planning; Leys looks there for analytic clues.

The most useful distinction—between plan-making and implementation is hardly revolutionary. Most important is the urging to governmentists to study planning as politics, plus the methodological advice: look for 1) type and distribution of authority in the planning system, 2) “activators” available, and 3) mechanisms for decision-making. Leys' discussion of Tanzanian planning is instructive.

Despite its heavy scholarship and footnoting, Joan Vincent's article on *anthropology* and development makes a number of telling points about the peculiar strengths of her discipline. Political scientists recognize that at least the newer low-income states tend to be, as Zolberg says of Africa, “. . . an almost institutionless arena. . .” It is the pre-state institutions that count, and that is what anthropologists study. They generally work in the field; governmentists in the capitals. The former are running out of closed societies of primitive people to study, so they are ready to take on de-

velopment. One may not agree, for instance, that stratification is the essence of the modern state, but it seems obvious enough that good political science of development should be much more anthropological.

Peter Nettl, who died tragically in 1968 and to whom the collection is dedicated, contributed a very literate article on *development theory*. The universal priority of development is asserted; the author emphasized that we don't agree completely on what it is and that existing theories are better at pointing up problems than at providing solutions. Theory is essential; without it we are doomed to gather data at random. However, the article concludes with the need unfilled. As a starter, the author suggests loosening the connection between economic development and other types, and giving up teleological notions that equate development with Westernization and minimize the contribution of the poor to the rich. Attractive as these notions are, this reviewer feels that following them sacrifices what little conceptual clarity we have and misunderstands much of the drive for development.

Surveying *single-party politics* in the *Ivory Coast*, Martin Staniland argues that the party's successful takeover of the bureaucracy had led to its bureaucratization. His beginning is certainly promising; he castigates existing literature on African politics as banal and circular as a result of 1) ingenuously believing what ruling elites say about themselves and 2) using sloppy definitions and concepts. The reader's appetite is whetted but, unfortunately, he is in for a disappointment.

Staniland's analytical concepts—"levels" and "arenas" at/in which "political resources" are used by politicians to capture "prizes"—do not appear either very novel or promising. His recapitulation of Ivorian party history, drawn from well-known sources, is marred by slightly reckless generalizations and annoying factual errors (Ivory Coast is called a French overseas department—p. 144; most French post-war investment is said to have been drawn from the local budget—p. 160; . . .). Staniland destroys a few straw men, then elucidates the state of the party as revealed by his 1967 research in three administrative towns. The conceptual framework reveals nothing that would have been hidden from the informed layman.

Shafer's prolix article on *public administration* leaves developments in this field exactly where the author began—deadlocked. He complicates his task by trying to account for everything administrators do, whether administration or politics.

The "deadlock" is the realization that Western public-administration precepts contain cultural bias and that applying them uncritically to development situations, as "scientific" managementists once advocated, might not be appropriate to rapid

change. Bureaucratic administration fits this pattern too, Shafer says, but he fails to resolve on an alternative. Politicization of administration may be good, or it may not.

The author's only suggestion to planners is to try taking administration advice from temporarily posted, ad-hoc teams. Those experienced with short-term, visiting experts in low-income countries (mea culpa) will cringe at the thought.—W. I. JONES, *Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio*.

Abgeordnete in der Parteiendemokratie. BY PETER GERLICH AND HELMUT KRAMER. (Vienna: Verlag fuer Geschichte und Politik, 1969. Pp. 246. öS210.-)

This study of the political subculture of the *Gemeinderat* of Vienna, which is at once municipal council and state diet, leans heavily on the approaches to the study of legislative behavior introduced by the writings of John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau. The latter, in fact, presided over the beginnings of the project in 1964/1965. Ninety-eight of the 100 members of the *Gemeinderat* were interviewed and some of their comments are quoted at length. The project sought to ascertain (a) the composition of the body, (b) the careers of its members, and their attitudes toward (c) their party and (d) their constituency, and (e) their conception of their functions. The authors claim only to have explored but not exhausted their study of the role conceptions and images of their legislators for lack of comparable exploration of the role conceptions of administrators, party leaders, journalists, associated representatives and other roles interacting with those of the members of the *Gemeinderat*. The quantitative manipulations in this study use two kinds of data: attitude sets, such as the segments of the legislators' role conceptions toward various other agents, and social background data taken mostly from official sources. The sociological information includes age, sex, previous occupation, outside occupations, seniority, rank or offices held, committee memberships and data on the members' political socialization.

Since the legislative setting in Vienna and elsewhere in Austria has not been sufficiently examined before, the authors set their empirical explorations into an ample framework of institutional description and historical sociology. The changing character of Viennese legislative assemblies and their composition over the last one hundred years gives meaning to recent changes in recruitment patterns. The evolution of the dominant political parties—the smaller ones are rather neglected in this book—explains some of the notable differences which emerge in their role conceptions and in the social backgrounds of their members. To the uninitiated mind, this historical and institutional background is quite indispensable to an ap-

preciation of the empirical findings. In fact, the indispensability demonstrates the irrelevance of empirical and behavioral research when it is divorced from a thorough knowledge of the setting. The thorough coverage, in any event, should facilitate comparison with legislative behaviors and subcultures elsewhere, or at least protect the comparative researcher from the most obvious pitfalls.

Gerlich and Kramer proceed from the historical background to the sociological tabulations on the membership. Their findings that the *Gemeinderat* is more representative of contemporary Viennese society than were earlier legislative assemblies is contrasted with American findings and with the inherent contradictions of representative theory and practice. How can legislators be perfect "social representatives" of a society whose members have to work full-time at their trade and who have, precisely for that reason, delegated their representation to more or less full-time representatives?

The most interesting chapter of this study, to the mind of this reviewer, is the chapter on the political socialization of the deputies. Along the incisive impact of historical events between the wars and the discussion of how early the respondents became involved in politics permit fascinating glimpses of Austrian political culture. There are, for example, significant differences between the Socialists (SPÖ) who start with politics early in life and under more family influence than members of the People's Party (ÖVP) who were often impelled more by friends, colleagues and associations. Youth organizations played an important recruitment function in both parties. The nomination patterns to candidacy for the *Gemeinderat* again differ substantially with the SPÖ deputies being placed in nomination chiefly by their district organizations while the party leadership and the chamber organizations play a larger role with the ÖVP. The authors also devoted some attention to the process by which new deputies are broken in, and to the place of *Gemeinderat* membership in the total career expectations of the deputies.

The rest of the book is a competent replication of the Wahlke-Eulau approach to the study of subjective legislative role images. Gerlich and Kramer segment the total role images in orientations vis-a-vis the respective party and the constituency from which the deputies were elected. Despite their emphasis on the stronger party role in Austria as compared to the United States, their treatment of this segment appears to be rather meager. The relations to the constituency, to the voters, special interests and associations, and the delicate balance between orientations according priority to the city over the districts and vice versa, on the other hand, are covered convincingly and in depth. The tabulation of role images of the

decision-making postures—ritualists, popular tribunes, etc.—and the attitudes toward the administration and the clientele of voters and organized interests brings no great surprises. One would hope that the various replications of the *Legislative System* model might soon be subjected to systematic cross-national comparison.

The authors made no attempt to corroborate the subjective role conceptions of their legislators with their actual behavior. Thus, we are still groping in the dark regarding the relevance of this aspect of the political subculture of the *Gemeinderat* to its actual functioning. They did a considerable service, nevertheless, to the study of continental European legislatures by relating their concepts and findings to the ongoing debate about the decline of parliamentary democracy. Since this debate so often languishes in sterile juxtapositions of 19th century representative theories with mid-twentieth century political realities, the exploration of the subjective role conceptions of legislators in itself is likely to contribute to a broader appreciation of contemporary representative functions beyond myth and cultural pessimism. There can be little question but that the authors succeeded admirably in explaining some of the functions of the Viennese *Gemeinderat* to whomever cares to read their study.—PETER H. MERKL, *University of California, Santa Barbara*.

Le phénomène gaulliste. BY JEAN CHARLOT. (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1970. Pp. 206. 24 F.)
Recherche sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle: Analyse statistique des allocutions radiodiffusées 1958-1966. BY JEAN-MARIE COTTERET AND RENÉ MOREAU. (Paris: Armand Colin, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. *Travaux et recherches de science politique*, 1969. Pp. 247. 39 F.)

Le phénomène gaulliste raises high hopes, promising to "immerse the men of politics and a good number of the French in perplexity,"; nevertheless, the book is likely to prove disappointing to those familiar with Charlot's earlier effort, *L'U.N.R. Étude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique*. In his latest work the merchandise is somewhat worn and noticeably absent is reference to or development of phenomena that one might hope to find—e.g., relationships between Gaullism and the military, the full meaning of various important conflicts within the Gaullist organization, interaction in and after 1967 between Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing, Gaullism and the handling of communications media (especially the *O.R.T.F.*). These are but some of the many *lacunae* characteristic of the study. Finally, the reviewer cannot help note in Charlot's study how *Le phénomène gaulliste* and *Le phénomène gaulliste imaginaire* occasionally get in each other's

way, particularly when he claims that the *U.D.R.'s* internal convergences completely overshadow those contradictions harbored by it—and when he states that these contradictions most often contribute to the advantage of a modern organization engaged in the business of contributing consciously to the construction of a modern party system.

Charlot views *Le phénomène gaulliste* as a mutation of the French political system. The departure of de Gaulle marks for him not the end of Gaullism but simply the termination of “a Gaullism.” Charlot finds—“in contrast to the findings of so many others”—that *Le phénomène gaulliste* is not simply a moment in an endless cycle but a truly different and durable development in French political life representative of the passage from a system of weak and multiple political parties to a system of the dominant party (perhaps even to bipartism?) and the birth of a “party of voters” based on other than cadres and militants. Moreover, this party’s multiple ideological tendencies lack for Charlot the diversity characteristic of a “party of militants,” contributing not to the *U.D.R.'s* disadvantage but to its “richness.”

Charlot concludes that the opposition to Gaullism failed to fully appreciate its nature, taking cognizance of its leader while underestimating the support given the *U.N.R.*, *U.D.V.* and *U.D.R.* Believing that the organization would disappear with the departure of de Gaulle, the opposition ignored the constant reinforcement of another Gaullism—the Gaullism of a party—whose growth contributed eventually to both a qualitative and structural transformation of the party system. Charlot notes after 1958 that the history of Gaullism was one of ascending “new Gaullists” and descending “old Gaullists”; with the “arrival” in 1967 of the *modernes*, the organization underwent profound transformation—restructuring, liberalizing and modernizing itself. Finally, Charlot finds it “astonishing” that de Gaulle made foreign policy his *domaine réservé*, commenting that Pompidou’s *domaine réservé* would be education, not national defense, and that after all these years of imperial grandeur Pompidou represents “perhaps” the “firm wiseness of a Louis XVIII.”

Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle was reviewed extensively in France in 1969 and discussed on the radio-television service presentation *France-Culture*. French assessments of the work include, “a remarkable application of the *ordinateur* in the field of letters,” “scientific and dry,” not intended for “*esprits légers*,” etc., etc.

Cotteret and Moreau, who describe their book as at the crossroads of “four new sciences—political science, statistics, linguistics and communications,” seek through use of the *ordinateur* to ini-

tiate a step in the direction of producing an instrument of study that can be applied to a vocabulary. Examining statistically the 62,471 words articulated in radio-television addresses by General de Gaulle between 1958 and 1965, the authors establish a typology that distinguishes between two kinds of speeches—*discours-appels* and *discours-bilans* (in the former utilization of the pronouns *je-vous* is elevated and use of the pronoun *nous* practically extinct, whereas in the latter utilization of the pronoun *nous* is elevated and use of the pronouns *je-vous* disappears almost completely). The authors determine if the speeches containing the pronouns *je-vous* have in common a series of words whose frequency of utilization is superior to the average utilization of the other words; the method then is repeated with the speeches containing the pronoun *nous*. Consequently, the authors discover around *discours-appels* a word-network consisting of “*république, état, peuple, moi, confiance, nation*,” and around *discours-bilans* “*notre, année, économique, monde, développement, progrès*.”

Having established two types of *discours*, Cotteret and Moreau make the following comments on each. *Discours-appels* are brief, direct (so as not to weary the listener), rich in vocabulary and of a marked interpellative character, whereas *discours-bilans* do not interpellate, they merely state. *Discours-appels* seek to convince the listener that he is directly concerned, while *discours-bilans* seek to convey to the listener the feeling of having collaborated in what the General is summarizing. Among the *discours*, only three fall outside the authors’ typology and all are related to the presidential campaign of 1965 (here the authors acknowledge that the usual schema is abandoned and replaced by a scene with but three actors—de Gaulle, the press corps and the French—and the General plays no longer with the public but before it, seeking to raise emotions and to give information).

The authors relate to the nature of the times and to de Gaulle’s style and personality the frequency of his speeches, the number of words articulated by him, the length of his sentences and the richness of his vocabulary. Speeches delivered by de Gaulle at the beginning of his *septennat* were frequent and incisive; nevertheless, with the passage of time, his speeches became more “ample” and less percussive, with assurances to the listener that *tout va bien*. Although the length of de Gaulle’s speeches generally did not vary, the length of his sentences increased with the years—convincing the authors that this acceleration was tied to the deintensification of the political events then in play (and leading them to suggest that “Perhaps the day will come when we will be able to measure the well-being of the state by the

length of sentences of its political men?"). Finally, the authors conclude that the richness of de Gaulle's speeches corresponds very well to those texts written in modern French.

Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle searches for links between words and times and suggests the need for systematic analyses of the means of communication so as to facilitate new approaches to the study of political phenomena. Many of the techniques applied to de Gaulle's vocabulary will be familiar to those acquainted with efforts undertaken elsewhere by those involved in the study of linguistics. Finally, if the results obtained by Cotteret and Moreau are somewhat disproportionate to their prodigious efforts, this is entirely understandable in a work of this kind. *Recherches sur le vocabulaire du général de Gaulle* merits more than passing attention and one hopes that it will not be brushed aside in cursory fashion by those impatient with the methods employed in it.—LOWELL G. NOONAN, *San Fernando Valley State College*.

The Jana Sangh: Biography of an Indian Political Party. BY CRAIG BAXTER (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. Pp. 352. \$12.50.)

Until the Congress split in the fall of 1969 the Jana Sangh was India's second largest political party. It is the fastest growing party in India, and the only one of the major parties which is run and operated by persons with little or no background in the umbrella-like Congress Party. In this sense "illegitimate" in its birth, the legitimacy of the Jana Sangh is also doubted by many Indians because it challenges the fragile framework of secularism within which India's multitudinous communities live together. The epithets which it evokes from opponents—"right," "rightist," "reactionary," "communal" and even "fascist"—are an indication also of its organizational discipline and the militancy of the youth organization, the R.S.S., from which many of its members are drawn. Yet this large and controversial party has received little scholarly attention, and Baxter's study is to be welcomed.

Baxter frames his study as a biography, beginning with the party's origins in the Hindu Mahasabha, which arose in response to the Muslim League; turning then to its ideological and organizational ancestor, the revivalist Hindu R.S.S., which continues to supply the party organization with its very powerful secretaries. The major portion of the book is devoted to documentation of party growth and policy articulation, in which party conferences and Indian general elections are the major events. There is one chapter on each of the four elections which reports on party organization, manifesto, tactics, and results, ending with an

appraisal of policy toward alliances with other parties. Alternating with these chapters are accounts of success in other elections, organizational development, parliamentary impact, and extra-parliamentary activities, which include the tragic Kashmir Satyagraha in 1952 that resulted in the death of the party's founder and the anti-cow slaughter agitation in 1966. The care in tracing changes in policy toward Kashmir, the national language controversy, foreign policy, and land reform is a significant contribution of the book.

Two themes of much interest emerge: the failure to effect electoral alliances, and the internal party conflict between R.S.S. and non-R.S.S. wings. The two are, of course, related. In the first two elections the party's most natural allies were the Hindu right parties which it unsuccessfully courted, losing seats which might have been gained if votes had not been divided. In the fourth election its most likely ally was the classically liberal Swatantra Party, with which a useful alliance was formed in states where the Jana Sangh was weak, but not in the two states where such an alliance would have enabled it to gain many more seats. On the whole, this is not a good record. Yet the arithmetic manner in which Baxter assesses the costs of non-alignments—adding the votes of the two would-be allies to determine if the total would have won the seat—provides only a partial assessment. More insight is needed into the reasons for the failure to align, which would enable an assessment of the costs of alignment as well, in terms of the seats the party would have forfeited to its allies, and compromises in the party program.

The non-R.S.S. wing of the party has been more willing to make these compromises than the R.S.S. dominated party organization. More attuned to electoral prospects, the non-R.S.S. leaders espouse the more pragmatic politics of negotiation on Kashmir, electoral alliances, and participation in coalition governments. The R.S.S. cadre are more concerned with cultural purity and cohesion of Hindu India, with an ambivalence toward politics which has made political investigation of the Jana Sangh difficult. They have urged the party to enter elections alone with the militant Hindu views for which the party is known—opposition to cow slaughter, recovery of portions of Kashmir now in Pakistan, etc. This is a familiar and important conflict in strongly issue-oriented cadre parties operating in electoral systems. Yet with little material on the internal party divisions in which this conflict is articulated, Baxter misses also its implications for the party's capabilities in the pluralistic social environment. Unlike the Congress, the Jana Sangh is not an aggregative party. Baxter finds an increasing flexibility after 1967 in adapting to local issues and power constellations, to the

point of state units taking opposing sides on the same issue, but concludes that major concessions are unlikely. Though not explicitly linked to internal party affairs, this conclusion seems to indicate that the organizational cadre will continue their predominance. According to most analyses of Indian politics their non-aggregative model will limit the party's capabilities; yet so far the Jana Sangh has done remarkably well.

With such an emphasis on electoral politics, one misses much of the dynamic of this party. It is known for discipline in containing these factional conflicts, which Baxter attributes to the R.S.S. training of party cadre. Yet with no description of the early morning exercise sessions and the other modes in which the R.S.S. firms its recruits, the loyalty and militancy of the Jana Sangh cadre remain effectively unexplained. Similarly with no depth analysis of any of the communal incidents for which the Jana Sangh is frequently blamed, the party's relationship to a crucial set of emotional issues remains unarticulated. It is a mark of the scholarly tone of his work that Baxter does not place much emphasis or find a label for the party. Without materials of this kind, however, his characterization of the Jana Sangh as a conservative party appears more as caution than analysis.

There are more conceptual questions as well which one would like a study of the Jana Sangh to illuminate. How is Hindu tradition reshaped by being placed in party platforms: How might the Jana Sangh help to formulate a conception of nation and community which would make modernization more accessible to the many new political participants for whom western secularism has few referents: What role does tradition play for the apparently modernizing sectors, students, intellectuals, and urban middle class, who have been attracted to the Jana Sangh—increasingly so recently. Baxter suggests that the cow and the nuclear bomb cannot both be accommodated, that modern technology will bring a secularism which the Jana Sangh opposes—this also I would like to leave as a question.

No study can move in these many directions. Baxter's biography has provided much useful material and opens up a set of questions which many scholars will want to consider—perhaps the most important compliment to any work.—CAROLYN ELLIOTT, *University of California, Santa Cruz.*

The Face of the Third Reich: Portraits of the Nazi Leadership. BY JOACHIM C. FEST. Translated by Michael Bullock. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. Pp. 402. \$10.00.)

Joachim Fest has written a balanced account of the Third Reich in which he focuses on the personalities of its leaders. He divides his book into three parts, the first dealing with Hitler, the sec-

ond with those who in Mr. Fest's judgment were next in command (Göring, Goebbels, Heydrich, Himmler, Bormann, and Röhm), and the third with "functionaries" such as Franz von Papen, Hans Frank, and the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss. The third part also contains studies of three groups of "functionaries" none of whom, according to the author, had a typical member. These groups are the generals, the intellectuals, and all the women who were mobilized in one way or another into the service of the Third Reich.

Apart from the problem of ranking his subjects according to their places in the Nazi hierarchy, Mr. Fest had to decide whom to deal with and whom to ignore. He tries to justify his failure to discuss certain high officials by saying that their personalities were not very different from those of some of his subjects. But it remains unclear why there is a study of Albert Speer and none, let us say, of Hjalmar Schacht, why Rudolf Hess is dealt with and not Robert Ley, and so on. Also, we are left to derive what we will about two especially interesting groups, the judges and the civil servants, from a general discussion of Weimar conservatism which occurs in passing in the chapter on Papen. One wonders why the generals but not the civil servants rate a chapter. Mr. Fest answers this question by saying that to deal with the civil servants and other groups whom he ignores would withdraw attention from the guilt of the entire German population. But ethical problems aside, why then single out any groups for special treatment?

Yet I spoke of the book as balanced, and the fact that Mr. Fest treats a number of things in passing was one of my reasons for doing so. To cite two examples besides his discussion of Weimar conservatism, he uses the chapter on Bormann to discuss the governmental structure of the Third Reich and the one on Goebbels to deal with Nazi propaganda. The digressions contain nothing less than a summary of the collective wisdom of the social sciences on the structure and the appeals of the Nazi regime. This summary and the studies of individuals and groups combine to make the book a reasonably comprehensive account of the Third Reich.

Other factors add to the balance of the book. Mr. Fest is restrained (and convincing) in his attempts at psychoanalysis. And his concluding remarks about the future of the Bonn Republic could not be more sober, though readers who overrate the importance of the recent decline of the National Democratic Party (NPD) may find his outlook too dreary.

Mr. Fest has distinguished himself in West Berlin and West Germany as a radio and television journalist. Unfortunately, he fails to bring the proper methodological rigor to his book. This lack

is most pronounced in his numerous references to ideology. He does not offer an explicit definition of the term. One must invariably read a definition into the context, and the definitions are by no means uniform. Still, the remarks taken together form a most sensible statement on the relations between ideas and political behavior in the Third Reich.

The author does give some thought to the problem of defining "totalitarianism." He says that totalitarianism differs from "the classical forms of coercive government" in its attempt to remake man, and proposes this attempt as its defining characteristic (p. 292). His suggestion recalls one of Hannah Arendt's themes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. To be sure, before the definition could gain wide usage agreement would have to emerge on whether all regimes which are considered totalitarian, and these alone, sought to remake man. Mr. Fest does not offer the necessary evidence, or even reveal all his assumptions about what would constitute human re-creation. There is the further problem that the definition might increase the danger, already great in some conservative circles, of overestimating the extent and the causal significance of totalitarian leaders' aims with respect to human nature. But fortunately Mr. Fest does not make this mistake in dealing with the German case, informed as he is about the roles played by Nazi ideology in the various senses of that term.

For sources, Mr. Fest relies mainly on books, journal articles, and the records of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. His most original and enlightening chapters are on individual Nazi leaders other than Hitler. These chapters can be seen as an extension of Miss Arendt's insights into the banality of evil. The part of the book devoted to Hitler is largely a survey of well-known material which had appeared before the German edition was published in 1963. (The notes in the English edition take account of some of the more recent material.) The most disappointing chapter is the one on the intellectuals. It scarcely recognizes the problem of men such as Wilhelm Furtwängler and Werner Heisenberg who, whatever they thought of the regime, continued to exercise their extraordinary talents under it and to lend it their prestige.

Several comments on technical matters ought to be made. Michael Bullock has produced a serviceable translation, though it is an obvious misreading of the original to put down that Göring shared with Renaissance man a supreme sense of style and a refined feeling for life, and Papen's political party (the Center) deserves to have its name capitalized. The publishers would have enhanced the value of the book if they had reprinted the pictures of the subjects from the German edition.

The book is nevertheless the best available introduction to the Third Reich. Especially in Germany, where psychoanalysis has traditionally been more suspect than it is here, the book should raise the general level of ability to recognize political figures with severe emotional disturbances, and that will be a very useful function indeed.—GLENN SCHRAM, *Marquette University*.

The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism.

BY JAY B. SORENSON. (New York, Atherton Press, 1969. Pp. 283. \$9.50.)

This book, like a great deal else published today, bears out Alexander Erlich's remark in his parallel *The Soviet Industrial Debate 1924-1928*, that "The ideas of the twenties are far from dead in our days." There have not of course been any genuine discussions in the Soviet Union since 1928, and while the country has changed massively since then it is certain that their own experience is more relevant to current Soviet problems than ours.

Erlich's book was an attempt to reconstruct the debate in terms of economic theory; Professor Sorenson is concerned primarily with the politics and institutional structures which helped to produce the modern Soviet regime. As such it is a fascinating study of a certain type of politics—that of a bureaucracy, where there is no recall or referendum to a broad constituency, and no limits placed by cost accounting. The winners are not necessarily "right" in any economic or political sense, but it is they who write the history and determine policy into the future. In the case of the events described in this book it may very well have been Burkhariu who was "right," in all senses except the final one, victory.

For many purposes the story ends in 1921 at the 10th Party Congress with the final departure of the Communist Party from any real pretence at a genuinely popular role. The Congress was preceded by the dangerous mutiny at Kronstadt which was crushed by force, and by a long debate on the role of the "unions" in the new Soviet State. The answer was a resolution "On Unity" which left and leaves no room for "factionalism" or any real debate within the Party, much less outside. Lenin himself presented this resolution and so can be considered the author of the Stalinist tyranny, and certainly of Stalinist labor policy.

The rest of the book details how these decisions were implemented, the growing power of Stalin within the Party and the Party within the state. As Professor Sorenson indicates, the basic millenarianism of Lenin and of most of the other Bolsheviks pushed them to decisions which were seldom fully rational, and have proved in many cases harmful to their own goals. The process continues

today. Brezhnev, faced with the usual serious crisis in agriculture and a growing industrial crisis, can only ask Soviet workers to go once again into the breach, to fight on to victory, all military metaphors, and not overly applicable, one would think, to what are basically flawed economic structures. Professor Sorenson makes it clear why and when Soviet politics and Soviet economics became hopelessly entwined, so that any reforms on the economic side threaten the power and integrity of the communist Party.

All and all a very useful book. Professor Sorenson does not entirely avoid the usual difficulty of identifying "workers," working class, trade union movements, labor movements, though he does struggle to make clear which he is speaking about and when. This is especially necessary for the early years when the "spontaneous organization of the working class" seems to have taken the form of factory committees of an anarcho-syndicalist cast. In many cases the Bolsheviks imposed trade unions as a method of control. The genuine unions which had roots in the Tsarist period, like the railway workers, became opposed to Bolshevik control and had to be crushed. The whole picture of "labor" is further clouded by the traditional strong ties of the Russian industrial worker to his native village and by the failure except in a few crafts for any sense of class identity to develop.

One does not have to go as far as the late Isaac Deutscher in assuming that an emerging "working class" will come to play a major role as a class in the full Marxist sense in future Soviet politics to develop a feeling that the present Soviet labor union structure has its weaknesses, and that the relationship "labor-unions," and Party-State may be a critical one in the future. It is interesting to note that in the recent (1966) *Industry and Labour in the USSR*, a work by Soviet industrial sociologists, there is no attempt to discuss the role of the trade unions. One suspects no Soviet sociologist would care to comment.

Professor Sorenson also struggles with the subject of historical inevitability vs. the only too obvious Bolshevik manipulations, and comes out strongly for the proposition that the Soviet Regime was the product of a series of accidents. This is of course a hardy perennial, and has been handled better elsewhere.

It is a pity, especially in view of the useful documentation and bibliography, that the book was not provided with an adequate index.—LOIS STONE, *SUNY at Albany*.

The Working-Class Tories: Authority, Deference, and Stable Democracy. By ERIC A. NORDLINGER. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 276. \$8.95.)

This book is one of a series of writings in recent

years about "the working class Tory vote." Nordlinger joins several political scientists and journalists in placing a great emphasis on those members of the English working class who cast their vote upwards to the middle class Tory party. While such a voting pattern surely does exist, it is baffling why, in contemporary English politics, this is considered so important or, for that matter, so unusual. For if one broadens the field of view to also include a look at middle class voting behavior, one finds that not a very much larger percentage of the working class vote Tory than the middle class vote Labour (32% and 20%, respectively). Further, it is significant that these figures were derived using objective class definitions, and, if people's own subjective class identifications are instead employed, then the figures come yet closer together (28% and 21%, respectively). Data taken from Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, pp. 106, 76).

Nordlinger again embraces the views of others when he explains much of this working class Tory voting as due to deferential attitudes. For years, citations of "deference theories" have been prominent in the literature as explanations of the working class Tory vote; however, actual survey results have shown that the large majority of the reasons given are not deferential, but rather give the same reasons the rest of the English population gives for voting Tory. The reasons are fairly common and expected ones concerning "bread and butter" issues, government management, and the personality and ability of party leaders (without attempting to construe the latter as "deference"). These reasons are just as valid for the working class as for the middle class—especially if one considers that the Tories were just completing a well-managed and prosperous fourteen year rule at the time of Nordlinger's study in the summer of 1964, and that they had been actively appealing to working class interests ever since the Reform Bill of 1867, as McKenzie and Silver amply document in their book, *Angels in Marble*.

Of course, there are a scattering of "deferentials" among the working class. But the answers to open-ended questions in surveys show that they are a minor phenomenon. Nordlinger approached his data in such a way—predicated upon an Ecksteinian theory of attitudes toward authority relations—that he overemphasized the "deferential" aspect of working class Toryism, so much so that to him it is the vital key to England's stability as a democracy.

There are several reasons why this overemphasis on the deference explanation resulted. First, Nordlinger did not incorporate the middle class into his sample, so contrasts of its political attitudes and voting behavior with those of the working class were impossible. This distorted his perspective as

to the importance and uniqueness of working class voting deviancy and the deferential theory underlying it. Second, he did not place enough emphasis on—or more accurately, he did not derive the vital deductions from—the open-ended questions he asked about the parties, and they provide definite clues as to the place of “deference” versus other explanations the working class gave for supporting the Tories. Third, he defined “deferentials” on the basis of answers to two close-ended questions—presenting structured, forced-choice questions that may have had little relevance to the subject’s actual thinking about politics and the parties. (Open-ended questions asking the things people like and dislike about the parties should instead have been used to define who the “deferentials” were—they reveal the spontaneous feelings of subjects.) The fact that only 28% of the working class Tory voters replied affirmatively to two dichotomous questions, and, hence, were classified as “deferentials” in Nordlinger’s scheme, should have alerted him that this was not a sizable quantity on at least two counts: one, 28% is a small figure relative to the emphasis Nordlinger placed on it; two, one would expect 25% of the working class Tory sample to choose the two affirmative replies by chance alone.

A last effort by Nordlinger to emphasize the importance of the 28% deferential figure is also questionable in its interpretation. Several questions purporting to tap “acquiescence” to political authority showed somewhat higher values than the 28% figure. But a real problem is in understanding the meaning of these results. Were individuals truly conscious of and acquiescing to the political authority structure, or were they rather manifesting a disinterest in or remoteness from politics in general? If the working class is little involved in politics, it is difficult to impute a general feeling of conscious deference toward the political authority structure typified by Tory rule.

The rest of Nordlinger’s analysis basically contrasts the working class Tory “deferential” and “pragmatic” voters (the latter are the 72% residue) with the working class Labour voters, on various social, attitudinal, and behavioral variables. The Tory “pragmatists” are those working class Tory voters who answered the two close-ended questions in any combination other than giving affirmative replies to both. A fourth category in the tables Nordlinger presents in his book is “*all* working class Tory voters,” combining the “deferential” and “pragmatist” categories.

Throughout the multitude of tables presented, one is more impressed with the absence of analytic differences between the working class Tory and Labour voters than by their presence. Small differences are the rule and not the exception. In the

case of comparisons between all Tory and all Labour voters, it is possible that either (a) the two groups did not in reality differ much on various criteria or (b) they just were not different on the particular criteria Nordlinger selected for his analysis. As for the comparisons of the two separate categories of Tory voters, “deferentials” and “pragmatists,” with Labour voters one feels restrained because it is difficult to know what weight to put on the categories as defined. Several of the cross-breaks indicate the volatility of the “deferential” group, and, although there probably are some true “deferentials” in this category, there seems to be a lot of “random noise” here also. The residue “pragmatist” group of the Tory voters and the Labour voters seem to be quite similar—the first being attracted to the Tories for their issues and the second being attracted to Labour for its policies. But essentially, it is socio-economic considerations which probably underlie the vote decisions of these two groups.

One of the several cases in which Nordlinger does not find a relationship is when contrasting age (or “political generation”) to his typology of working class Tory and Labour voters. This is surprising since both the McKenzie-Silver and Butler-Stokes studies found a relationship, and, the latter especially, probed it to reveal still other factors than issues which prompted working class Toryism—basically, the socialization of children into Tory allegiance by parents who lived during the time when Labour was not a major contestant on the electoral scene. The strength of such identification increases over time as has been shown in American voting studies, shaping attitudes toward leaders, issues, etc.—without necessarily implying “deference” but rather the intrinsic value placed on psychological identification with a party. These socialized children are now the older cohorts of the Butler-Stokes sample and are largely responsible for the greater percentage of working class who vote Tory than middle class who vote Labour mentioned above. The cross-class voting of the younger cohorts, on the other hand, balances out—the younger set choosing their parties more on the basis of policy and issue reasons.

Other causal factors also seem to have been missed by Nordlinger in explaining working class Toryism—regional differences, religious differences, the “government turnover” philosophy of the people, and the decline of the Liberal party in British politics with its resulting redistribution of the working class vote. Despite Nordlinger’s stated intentions, he picked very few relevant variables and engaged in hardly any multivariate analysis. In essence, one learned little from Nordlinger’s work about the phenomenon of working class Toryism, the factors affecting it, or the proper per-

spective in which to place its relevance and importance on the larger British political scene.—JEROLD G. RUSK, *Purdue University*.

Latin American Peasant Movements. EDITED BY HENRY LANDSBERGER (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. 476. \$12.50.)

Though peasants have comprised more than half of the population of Latin America and in recent years peasant movements have emerged in a number of countries, only isolated case studies have appeared in print. *Latin American Peasant Movements* by Henry Landsberger is the first serious attempt to provide us with a collection of detailed case studies of peasant politics. Moreover the editor, in his introductory essay, has provided us with a thoughtful comprehensive analytic framework for understanding the dynamic factors affecting the emergence and growth of peasant movements. The title of the opening essay, "The Role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in Development" is a misnomer; rather the bulk of the article is concerned with the emergence of peasant movements, the impact of development on their growth and the social-economic and political determinants of peasant politics. The opening essay purports to provide a common framework for analysis, though most of the contributors "deviate" considerably from it, perhaps because some of the essays are derived from doctoral dissertations written independently of this book.

The major value of these essays is found in the abundant descriptive details and the attempt to isolate variables accounting for movement variations. Unlike the impressionistic and discursive essays written by many of the older Latin Americanists we find the beginning attempts to apply quantitative techniques (Powell and Pearson's essays, for example) and in-depth political-anthropological studies.

The countries in which movements are studied include Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Peru (two essays), Guatemala and Brazil. An excellent concluding essay by Ernest Feder discusses the impact of ruling class repression on peasant movements, an area of research which unfortunately is too often neglected by U. S. political scientists.

As a pioneering effort, the essays in this casebook have a number of defects—both in methodology and in the analysis of the descriptive material.

In his essay "Guatemala: The Peasant Union Movement" Neal Pearson bases a substantial part of his analysis of peasant political attitudes on a secondary analysis of data collected from imprisoned peasants. Data based on interviews which could be political-incriminating and lead to possible physical elimination is hardly reliable. Hence

Pearson's assertion that "there was no significant correlation between being informed and membership in any of the organizations" may have been largely a product of the circumstances in which the "interviews" were taking place: interrogation in a jail by a member of the State Department, Office of Intelligence Research.

In their accounts of the activities of the opponents of peasant movements in Brazil, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Mexico there is almost a total absence of discussion of the role of the U. S.—though it is well known that the CIA was intimately involved in reversing the agrarian movement in Guatemala; that the U. S. provided economic and diplomatic support to the military junta that seized power and suppressed the peasant movement in Brazil; that the U. S. provided the financial and technical resources that reconstituted the Bolivian Army which eventually ousted the peasant-based MNR; that U. S. military expeditions invaded Mexico and attempted to destroy the peasant armies, etc.

Powell's account of the "success" of the peasant unions in Venezuela is a gross misrepresentation of its actual accomplishments—which he states in general terms but fails to detail. The great majority of Venezuelan peasants have either migrated to the growing urban slums or remained landless. The majority of agrarian reform "beneficiaries" have been given inadequate technical and financial assistance resulting in their subsisting on isolated plots of land. Furthermore, the power of the large landowners has not been seriously challenged in rural areas; together with a new class of middle class farmer (about twenty percent of the agrarian reform beneficiaries) they devour the larger part of the credits and marketing facilities made available for agrarian development; and the future trend is for these conditions to be accentuated.

A large and significant peasant movement organized by left-wing Catholics—who have since been forced out of the Christian Democratic Party—and Marxists has emerged for the first time in Chile during the past six years. Unfortunately Professor Landsberger chose to discuss a seventeen year old episode involving a defunct peasant union in the South of Chile. While his analysis is suggestive, his attempt in the concluding paragraphs to link his case study up with contemporary political developments is feeble. The members of the Catholic Left which have organized the majority of the unions were in grammar school when the events Landsberger describes took place. Furthermore the Marxist parties have enjoyed far more success in gaining the allegiance of the peasantry than Professor Landsberger is aware of. During the 1964 elections, in the central valley, a plurality of male rural voters cast their ballots for the Social-

ist-Communist candidate. These facts are hardly indicative of a "crushing defeat."

The account of the Mexican peasant movement by White also exaggerates the degree of success and fails to adequately take account of the enormous number of peasants who have not been materially affected by the revolution. Along with the bulk of the Mexicologists he fails to recognize the emergence of new exploitative classes which have emerged in the last twenty years and which clothe their political rhetoric in the language of peasant revolution while liquidating or co-opting grass roots peasant leaders who attempt to extend the revolution to the present day.

There are occasional intellectual lapses among some of the authors attempting to interpret peasant behavior that reveal some of their prejudices. For example, Powell inelegantly informs us that: "Current peasant choices of agrarian reform benefits and housing over education are perfectly consistent with everything we know (SIC) about the absence of deferred gratification behavior in backward peoples." One wonders who really is "backward": a peasant in search of a home and land for survival or a U.S. professor advising him to defer these "gratifications". . . .

On the other hand the article by Cotler and Portocarrero on Peruvian peasant unions and Cynthia Hewitt on Brazilian peasant movements are more balanced accounts, less influenced by the liberal biases found among the other contributors.

Huizer and Hewitt compile a comprehensive bibliography which will be especially helpful to the specialist largely because many of the entries are not generally available.—JAMES PETRAS, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

The Unionization of Teachers: A Case Study of the UFT. BY STEPHEN COLE. (New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1969. Pp. 245. \$8.00.)

Teacher Unions and Associations: A Comparative Study. EDITED BY ALBERT A. BLUM. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1969. Pp. 353. \$9.50.)

As interest in the politics of education expands, there has been an increased concern with the role of teacher organization. In 1967, Harmon Zeigler wrote *The Political Life of American Teachers*, a study based primarily on a survey of Oregon teachers. Also in that same year, James M. Clark published *Teachers and Politics in France*, a pressure group study. Two years later Alan Rosenthal wrote *Pedagogues and Power*, a comparative study of teacher organizations in five American cities. Now Stephen Cole has produced a sociological history of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), the nation's largest union local; and Albert Blum has edited a collection of essays on teacher movements in nine countries.

The growth of UFT, now more than 50,000

members strong, is a story worth telling not only because of its implications for American education, but also because of its significance in the development of unions for professionals, particularly government workers. Professor Cole, a young sociologist from Stony Brook, uses two principal research methods: interviews with 22 union leaders and a survey based on mail questionnaires returned by 331 New York teachers after their strike of 1962 (supplemented occasionally by a second survey of 126 teachers in Perth Amboy, New Jersey taken after their strike in 1965).

Until 1960, the history of teacher organizations in New York City was a tale of utter frustration. Fragmented along subject matter, grade level, geographical, ideological and religious lines, the teachers were at one time "represented" by 160 different groups. During the depression, teaching in New York City was one of the best jobs in the country. After World War II, however, neither salaries nor status of teachers kept pace with other professions. Dissatisfaction mounted but the necessary militancy to overcome internal divisions and to take action was slow to develop.

Part of the problem is that the ability to strike is both symbolically and functionally the key to successful union organization. Yet, traditionally, teachers feared to use this weapon, believing that whatever economic gain might be garnered would be offset by a loss of professional and class status. Furthermore such strikes were everywhere illegal.

The UFT was formed in March 1960 by a merger of the CATU, a dissident group of high school teachers, and the Teachers Guild, the remnants of the socialist movement among teachers. Six months later, the new union launched a strike to achieve collective bargaining and in 1962 another strike for wages. As strikes go neither was much of a spectacle. Most teachers crossed picket lines, and in the face of this low support and court injunctions, union leaders called the strikes off after the first day. But collective bargaining was won and the day after the second strike. Governor Rockefeller "found" \$13 million in additional state aid for the schools. This meant \$1000 a year raise for each teacher plus substantial fringe benefits. It was a lesson the teachers could not ignore and union membership boomed.

Cole's analysis of the strike focuses on two issues: which teachers were most likely to strike and which social conditions make such strikes effective?

Who are the militant teachers? Fifty-nine percent of the teachers in New York's public schools are Jewish as are an even higher percentage of the most visible union leaders. Cole finds, however, that militancy is related less to being Jewish than to family background that was lower-class, Democratic and pro-union. In Perth Amboy, where Jews

were more middle-class, Catholics were the most militant. Indeed there appears to be a negative correlation between intensity of religion and union militancy.

Other factors relating to militancy were youth, male sex, and teaching in a high school or even more a junior high. (These latter schools have the most discipline problems and the highest staff turnovers.) The educational philosophy of respondents, if one accepts the questions Cole asked as valid indicators, was not a factor.

Perhaps because of his limited sample size, Cole made no attempt to determine the attitudes of Black or Puerto Rican teachers regarding the strike. Given the current conflict between these minority groups and the UFT and the anti-union stance of the Afro-American Teachers Association, these attitudes would have been an interesting dimension to the study. In the light of these current hostilities, there is a certain irony in the unintentional assist the civil rights movement gave to union solidarity. According to one union organizer:

The teachers have been very afraid of committing illegal acts, and this is why the civil rights movement has been so important. Without the civil rights movement there never would have been so many teachers' strikes. The civil rights movement has given legitimacy to breaking the law when the law is immoral. The law prohibiting teacher strikes is immoral. . . . (p. 74)

As Cole points out the response of the men on the other side of the bargaining table to the growth of union power was generally weak or erratic. None of the potential techniques of social control—displays of paternalism, token concessions, co-optation of leaders or legal sanctions—was used very effectively. Sanctions, the author suggests, were particularly difficult to apply because of the pro-labor stance of Mayor Robert Wagner's administration and because the relevant statute (the Condon-Wadlin Act) called for instant dismissal of strikers, an overkill penalty few authorities were willing to invoke. These are clearly important factors, but Cole's failure to interview members of the school board or other political officials makes this chapter more speculative than necessary.

The most interesting policy question Cole discusses is whether unionization has had a negative effect on the professional interest of teachers in the improvement of schools. On this issue, which is the classic controversy between the National Educational Association and the American Federation of Teachers (the UFT's parent), the author is rather skeptical about the union's position. When there has been a choice between increasing the strength of the organization or advancing educational reform, Cole believes, UFT leaders have chosen the former. While on two issues, salaries and class size, the union has won substantial gains

for its membership and education generally; the leadership has also blocked reform of teacher licensing and evaluation procedures. The union has opposed the kind of faculty participation in hiring and promotion decisions common in universities on the grounds that such participation by its members would obscure management-labor distinctions.

This conflict between the well-being of the organization and the desperate need to reform urban schools may have a great influence on the future of teachers unions. Unfortunately, however, Cole's book was completed before the recent struggle over school decentralization in New York City began and he devotes only two pages in an epilogue to the subject. Though the decentralization issue is far from settled in New York and is just now emerging in other cities, the demand for accountability and performance that it represents may in the long run affect the union's ability to advance the economic interest of teachers, guard such perquisites as tenure or maintain internal solidarity. If as Cole found, the young, the poor and the liberal were the most ardent union members a decade ago, these same groups today often view unions as part of the establishment. These educational militants have found a new cause and a new enemy.

Albert Blum, Professor of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State, has collected ten original essays on teacher unions and associations ". . . to better understand the organizations teachers are developing as they make their demands." (p. vii) The volume, arranged alphabetically, includes chapters on Canada, England, West Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Thailand, the United States, and a final chapter on international teacher organizations. This internal arrangement and the nation-by-nation format suggest that the essays were commissioned and assembled without considering the need for a common analytical framework.

Consequently, the contributions which are also written from several disciplinary perspectives, produce very little in the way of comparative analysis. Many of the essays are unfocused descriptive inventories of the various organizations in each country rather than explorations into the sources and consequences of organizational behavior.

Blum suggests the concepts of professionalism and unionism as an organizing theme, while arguing that a major purpose of comparative study is ". . . to permit us to see our own problems and our answers to these problems from a wider vantage point." (p. vii) Professionalism/unionism may be appropriate categories for analyzing some aspects of the American scene; however, their ideological flavor, American origins, and tendency to reduce the complexity of stances taken by professional

organizations, suggests that they alone cannot serve as a framework for the comparative study of teacher organizations.

A preferable approach might have utilized the well-established literatures on organizational theory, industrial relations, group politics (particularly Lipset and Schwartz' essay "The Politics of Professionals" in Vollmer and Mills, *Professionalization*) and comparative political behavior to articulate the goals of research in this field.

A framework for the comparative analysis of teacher organizations must perform at least three tasks. First, it should help identify those variables which cause the diverse patterns of organizational behavior among teachers. Second, the framework ought to provide the analyst with a device for comparing the structure and behavior of teacher organizations. Third, and most difficult, it should provide some criteria for identifying the most important probable consequences of organized activity on the part of teachers. Ideally, the scheme should help us explore the "feedback" effects of organizational behavior on the society and the organization itself. It should also suggest what impact these patterns of behavior have for the governance of education and the quality of education.

Moscow and Doherty approach this ideal in their fine overview of the United States. They argue that the behavior of local affiliates of the NEA and the AFT is probably more satisfactorily explained by variables such as state-to-state differences in collective bargaining laws, alliances with labor organizations, increases in the proportion of men in the profession, competition between the rival organizations, and changes in the level of educational quality rather than by their professionalism or unionism identification. They also suggest that the professionalism—unionism *issue*, linked as it is to the problem of educational quality, cannot be resolved until an ". . . adequate yardstick exists by which one can measure education quality." (p. 331)

They surmise:

. . . that urban schools have deteriorated in recent years, but it would be foolish to attempt to show a cause and effect relationship between bargaining (a characteristic of unionism) and the decline in quality. . . . In fact it might be easier to show that it was the decline in educational quality that precipitated bargaining, and that without some form of collective activity, the erosion would have been much more rapid. (p. 331)

Although the essay on Canada by Douglas Muir is a substantial and well-written piece, it focuses on the diverse legal frameworks regulating teacher's rights to bargain collectively rather than on explanations of the organizational behavior of Canadian unions and associations. There is only a passing reference, for example, to the complex mosaic of the fascinating teacher movement in Que-

bec, where associations reflect the linguistic and religious cleavages of the province.

Similarly, Natarajan's chapter on India is also entirely descriptive. The author does not speculate on the possible consequences for the development of teacher organizations of the decentralization represented by the "Community Development Blocks."

Professors Heenan and Wranski in their chapter on Thailand describe a myriad of specialized teacher organizations such as the Pre-School Education Association of Thailand. They devote three pages to a listing of the welfare and continuing education programs of the *Khuru Sapha*, the government sponsored "company union" which all Thai teachers must join, without explaining why teacher organizations in Thailand have not achieved even a minimal degree of autonomy.

Victor Alba's essay on Mexico also fails to explain why teacher unions may have lost their autonomy. Why the teacher unions became largely linked to the Ministry of Education rather than the official party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) is a critical question he left unanswered.

The outstanding contribution to this volume is the chapter on Nikkyōso, Japan's most important and powerful teacher union. Solomon Levine, who authored *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan*, accounts for the rise and decline of Nikkyōso since the occupation, tracing its relationship to the labor movement, the Ministry of Education, and its ability to adapt to the centralized, decentralized and again re-centralized system of education in Japan since 1945. In what might well have served as a model for the entire volume, Levine's *tour de force* focuses on ". . . those features that appear useful for comparing Japan's experience with other nations." (p. 142)

While Blum's book takes the first step of suggesting that the comparative study of teacher organizations is worthy of our further attention, there is obviously much theorizing and research to be done.

Only eleven years ago, Thomas Eliot in an essay in this Review (December, 1959) accurately complained that political scientists had woefully neglected the politics of education. Since then, however, the number of universities offering courses in the field has grown to at least 44 and reading lists, albeit with some significant gaps, can be assembled for both American politics and the comparative politics of education. Cole and Blum have made useful contributions to these lists and several more comprehensive and theoretical works in the field are on the way.—PAUL M. COHEN, *Teachers College, Columbia University*. GEORGE R. LA NOUE, *Teachers College, Columbia University and Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute*.

Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment. EDITED BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH. (Berkeley: University of California, 1969. Pp. 441. \$9.50.)

This anthology of recent writings by seven contributors grew out of a conference on contemporary Yugoslavia held at Stanford University in December of 1965. Five of these articles were prepared for that conference; two others (on Yugoslav Marxist thought and on Yugoslav modernization) were commissioned. In light of these facts, this volume is surprisingly coherent in its diversity. In short, it represents a solid contribution to the study of contemporary Yugoslavia, and, although flawed, is well worth purchasing. To give some idea of the book's usefulness, I shall comment briefly on some of its weak points and its strengths. First off, how is it "flawed"?

The weaknesses of these efforts taken as a whole consist of being misleading, uneven and occasionally blatantly inconsistent. Like some comely women, this book is very attractive—even though its feet are much too big. The title, that is to say, is misleading, for one does not expect fully one third of the text of a work on "twenty years of socialist experiment" (sic) to survey pre-1945 Yugoslavia. The market abounds with a wide variety of competent works that provide that "necessary foundation." Unevenness is to be expected in an anthology, even among writers such as these seven who primarily are historically oriented. But the inconsistencies seem to indicate that several of these contributors did not take time to apprise themselves of each others efforts. For example, compare Tomasevich (p. 62) with Vucinich (pp. 25, 278) on the significance of the Concordat which was rejected by the Yugoslav parliament in 1937.

Turning to the body of the book, it offers much to inform the observer of modern Yugoslavia. Wayne Vucinich presents inter-war Yugoslavia in an even-handed fashion, setting the heavily historical tone that characterizes the entire book. Occasional lapses into historicism and a conspicuous absence of well-founded generalizations mar a generally profound presentation of Yugoslav political development during that period.

Jozo Tomasevich does deliver (as promised in the preface) "the finest short treatment of the enormously complicated Yugoslav war scene currently available," indicating in passing that Yugoslavia's stormy relations with the USSR began as early as 1942. Noteworthy is his judicious seven point conclusion.

Woodford McClellan's "Postwar Political Evolution" and Phyllis Auty's "Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945-1965)" jointly provide a sensitive analysis of Yugoslavia's domestic and international political metamorphosis during those

two decades. As Tito remarked bitterly to Phyllis Auty in 1951, the Yugoslavs have seldom had very satisfactory relations with the Russians. Perhaps this candid comment from the George Washington of Yugoslavia could serve as the implicit theme of this book.

George Macesich is quite disappointing in his efforts to inform the reader of "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia." Evidently an economic historian by nature, he immerses the reader in waves of economic statistics that all too seldom are examined for meaning. The facts too often are mute; Macesich describes not wisely but too well, often leaving major tasks of explanation and evaluation to the reader. Most inexcusable, however, is his cursory treatment of what several of these writers admit to being perhaps the most important contribution of the Yugoslavs to Marxist theory and practice: the principle of self-management and self-administration, in both economic and political spheres of activity. Closest to a general appraisal is his opaque statement (pp. 229-230) that

Strict application of such principles of management to an economic enterprise when coupled with the assumption of income-maximizing worker-managers has been shown to be theoretically inferior to existing practices in capitalist firms. . . . This does not mean that the Yugoslav system is not workable. It does mean that it is not fully efficient in the economic sense.

One wishes that Macesich would join his sometimes astute theoretical remarks to a firm description of the effectiveness of those principles in practice, especially as to how they vary in implementation from one region to another within Yugoslavia.

Vucinich, in his second contribution "Nationalism and Communism" draws the reader again back to inter-war Yugoslavia, and leads him up to date through a historical labyrinth of internecine warfare that strain a Westerner's imagination. Truly, as George Bailey commented (in *The Reporter*, July 1, 1955), Yugoslavia "harbours a family of nations united by the fear that their hatred of each other may be exploited by the outsiders." The Yugoslav communists have been able to surmount those animosities by pioneering in the construction of an independent, unitary (yet federal!) socialist state. Paradoxically, this not only allows for, but encourages real, sustained effort at political and economic decentralization. Although not yet fully achieved, this is a tribute to Yugoslav native pragmatic ingenuity and to their stubbornness in the face of a usually hostile, powerful USSR.

M. George Zaninovich presents "The Yugoslav Variation on Marx" in such sophisticated and persuasive fashion that it almost defies critical com-

ment. This talented theorist weaves together six threads of discussion into a colorful fabric that displays well Yugoslavia's "interesting and lively theorizing"—warts and all. The struggle of national liberation as a founding act of the Yugoslav state is quite stimulating reading. The immediate post-liberation, heavily Stalinist beliefs are forgotten by many current adulators of Yugoslavia. The basic Yugoslav conception of man and the man-nature relation is another artful exploration in mythology and political anthropology. Very intriguing is Zaninovich's discussion of the Yugoslav theory of state and society, which comprehends such matters as centralism, bureaucracy, etatism, decentralization, and self-government, touching also upon the newly qualified role of the Party. The Yugoslav theory of dynamics and socio-economic change shed light on the "socialist transformation" and the transition to communism. Finally, the nature and implications of the much-touted "young Marx" are examined for insights into current internal criticisms of the Yugoslav regime, as well as into the justifications offered by that regime itself for their rather bold theoretical (and practical) innovations.

This brilliant essay deserves close reading, for it will stand for some time as a major contribution to the study of Marxist theory and practice in general, and of modern day Yugoslavia in particular. The data of this article (as well as all others in this volume) are heavily based on a wide and deep reading of diverse Yugoslav sources in Serbo-Croatian. Further, the footnotes are valuable (and quite readable) for following lines of the argument in greater depth.

Logically it would seem that Joel Halpern's finely wrought work of condensation on "Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," would follow the Macesich offering in the procession of authors—but it doesn't. Rather, it serves as the concluding piece of this book, perhaps because it leaves the reader content after being simultaneously enlightened and entertained, in the best sense. Halpern's grasp of a wealth of data, presented with great verve, is formidable. His comments, weaving together economics, history, anthropology, geography, education, and political science, happily propel the reader to think about urbanization of the villages and peasantization of the towns, the role of extended families and kin ties in easing the pains of modernization, the emancipation of Yugoslav women, the Eastern European concept of *kultur*, and, most ingeniously, school primers as an index of regional modernization. This book ends on the up beat.

One final note. The excellent index merits mention. Unfortunately the binding, although a colorful and attractive grey and red, broke after one month's use (U.C. publishers, are you listening?).

Overall, this is an excellent source of stimulating and carefully considered thoughts on that most deviant socialist state, Yugoslavia. It is well worth reading.—GEORGE WAYNE BRADLEY, *San Francisco State College*.

Australian Federalism in the Courts. BY GEOFFREY SAWER. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 262. \$12.50.)

The Effect of Judicial Review on Federal-State Relations in Australia, Canada, and the United States. BY RICHARD E. JOHNSTON. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970. Pp. 320. \$12.00.)

Albert Venn Dicey, the *doyen* of English and Empire constitutional jurists in the golden age immediately before the outbreak of World War I, criticized federalism as meaning, variously, weak government, conservatism, and finally legalism. Geoffrey Sawer, an Australian lawyer, and Richard Johnston, an American political scientist from North Texas State University, address themselves to this third aspect of Dicey's triadic criticism of federalism, for each is concerned with the political impact of the courts on federalism in the exercise of judicial review of the constitution. Both books are comparative in emphasis, Professor Johnston's expressly and Professor Sawer in fact if not in stated design. Any study of the judicial interpretation of the Australian Constitution, of course, could hardly avoid taking note of American experience, since not merely did the Founding Fathers of the Australian Constitution borrow freely from the American Constitution in drafting their own constitutional text, but two of the leading judicial personalities, Isaacs and Dixon, were well acquainted with American Supreme Court decisions and drew freely upon them in their judgments.

Sawer's book is a non-technical book, clearly intended for the general social science reader as much as for law students. In a country that treats its constitution, and even more its constitutional judges, soberly and ponderously, Sawer has provided us with illuminating flashes of personal character and temperament of the individual judges which do much to explain otherwise idiosyncratic or aberrant judicial opinions. The frequent wit and irreverence and also the facility of style in Sawer's handling of the discussion of what are surely the most consistently long and also the most determinedly academic and conceptual court judgments among all the federal countries, may help to introduce a new and much-needed element of American-style Legal Realism into Australian constitutional law.

All the same, one cannot help wondering again after reading Sawer's book, how much Australian federalism, as law-in-action today, is really a response to calls for ethnic-cultural diversity or re-

gional particularism as in other federal societies; and how much, by contrast, it is a purely artificial, lawyer's creation—a sort of play within a play, built upon the scholarly erudition and the conceptualistic elaborations of what must surely be the ablest public law bar in the Commonwealth Countries. Felix Frankfurter used to recognise the degree of logical refinement of Australian constitutional jurisprudence in his remark, repeated more than once to visiting legal delegations, that the High Court of Australia was the World's strongest English-speaking court. It may be a tribute to the resilience of Australian society, if not rather a testimony to its relative un-complexity and freedom from internal strife, that it has survived such a continually rich diet of legal logic—*Begriffsjurisprudenz*—without too much of a political strain developing between the positive law and the society that it is intended to serve. If cases like the *Bank Nationalisation* case of 1948, in the political conflict between a Socialist federal government and a *laissez-faire*-oriented judiciary may seem, on a superficial view, to confirm the old maxim from American Constitutional history that those who can no longer control the legislatures tend to look to the courts as guardians of their special interests and privileges, these cases are easily balanced by the more usual political non-events like the *Airlines of New South Wales*, (No. 2), case (1965), where a Conservative federal government and a Socialist state government were joined in battle over the power to regulate internal, intra-state, air traffic; and where the court, on a basis of legal logic and without apparent regard to policy, happily upheld both jurisdictional competences, federal and state.

Professor Johnston, for his part, selects a rather wider canvas than Professor Sawyer, looking to judicial review of federal constitutions of the United States, Canada, and Australia, under the four main headings—inter-governmental immunity of instrumentalities; taxing and spending; foreign affairs; trade and commerce. He has done a thorough and comprehensive survey of the case law of the three federal systems surveyed. However, making allowances for the breadth of the subject and the comparative brevity of his treatment, I would have two main criticisms. First, in seeking to give us, in effect, a judge's-eye view of each of the three federal constitutions surveyed, Professor Johnston necessarily tends to imply that the institutional emphasis and balance in each of the three is the same, and that all three constitutions are judge-oriented in terms of really important community policy-making. A study of the constitutional law-in-action in each of the three federal systems might indicate, however, that this is just not so. Tax disputes that in Australia and in the United States might reach the courts, in Canada

today tend to be fought out in the Balkan War-type skirmishes and ambushes of the regular Dominion-Provincial Prime Ministers' Conferences and in the dependent Dominion-Provincial Tax Structure Committee. The *locus* of community policy-making, in federal constitutional matters in Canada, has tended therefore to shift from the federal Supreme Court (where it was dominant in the area of judicial liberal activism of the 1950's), to other arenas in the 1960's. And this brings us to the second main criticism. In relying, as he does, very largely on secondary, rather than primary, source materials, Professor Johnston is the victim of a certain political time-lag. His chapters, not merely on the taxing and spending powers but even more perhaps on the foreign affairs power, really need supplementing, in the case of Canada, by detailed examination of the federal constitutional implications of French Canada's "Quiet Revolution," inaugurated after 1960. The "Quiet Revolution" has already transformed very many aspects of the working federal constitution of Canada; but it is still essentially untested in the courts, and probably, if the present governmental preferred attitudes (federal and Provincial) prevail, never will be.—EDWARD MCWHINNEY, *McGill University*.

People vs Politics: A Study of Opinions, Attitudes and Perceptions in Vancouver-Burrard 1963-1965. BY J. A. LAPONCE. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Pp. 219. \$10.00.)

The average American is the most closely studied political animal in history. For the last three decades social scientists have been examining how he herds together, which mating calls he heeds, and how he "would vote if an election were held today." In Canada however, such information is limited. Our knowledge about polar bears still exceeds that about Progressive Conservatives.

Many factors have hampered the formulation of scientific explanations of the voting behavior of Canadians. Most significantly, lack of funds and expertise discouraged reliable national samples until the elections of 1965 and 1968. Thus the formulation and validation of theories has been difficult. However, small area studies have proven useful heuristically and for limited tests of hypotheses. The work considered here is the most thorough and imaginative to date. It is essentially an account of the behavior of electors in the federal constituency of Vancouver-Burrard during the federal and provincial elections held from 1963 to 1965. However, Professor Laponce also provides many insights into the voting behavior of Canadians generally.

The primary data sources are two random samples of the constituency. The first consists of 334 respondents (289 were interviewed before the 1963

federal election; 45 were interviewed after because of a previous refusal or non-contact). The second survey consists of 306 respondents, all of whom were interviewed before the 1965 federal election. These studies were supplemented by a reinterview of 115 respondents from the 1963 survey in November 1964, and by another random sample which produced 147 respondents before the provincial election of October 1963. In addition, data from several national surveys by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion were used to make more general inferences.

One of the most informative parts of the study concerns voluntary non-participation. In his first survey of 1963, Laponce found four types of people who chose not to vote in the election. The first type he calls boycotters. Comprising .6 percent of the potential electorate, they refuse to vote because they are opposed to politics generally. Another 2.4 percent of the potential electorate are classified as retired voters. These are former participants who no longer vote because of their age or health. A third group are called barbarians (8 percent). These are mostly poorly educated females who have little knowledge of politics, a poor perception of campaign issues, and little interest in voting. The fourth type of non-voters are called spectators (6.7 percent). They are mostly men who tend to abstain for political reasons even though they are better informed than the barbarians.

Laponce also presents some interesting findings on non-voting in the federal election of 1965. He shows, for example, that between 1963 and 1965 the level of non-voting among well-informed Liberals increased at a much greater rate than among poorly-informed Liberals. A common explanation of this phenomenon has been that well-informed Liberals abstained because they were cross-pressured by the unspectacular performance of Lester Pearson, or because none of the parties were particularly attractive (joint avoidance). However Laponce shows that Liberal voters and Liberal abstainers gave almost the same high ranking to both Pearson and the Liberal party. In addition, Diefenbaker and the Conservative party received almost the same low score among these two groups. If anything, turn-out among the well-informed was higher for those who were cross-pressured than for those who were not (p. 43).

Another set of interesting findings concerns the impact of different types of issues on the voter. Laponce defines two types of issues. Private issues are those which are already of concern to the voter, whereas public issues are those which the campaign brings to his attention for the period of the election. Private issues have greater impact on the voter, particularly when parties discuss them in the campaign. In contrast, public issues which

do not become private fade away once the campaign is over. Evidence of these differences comes in part from a reinterview of 110 respondents from the 1963 survey, eighteen months after the election. More people remembered "pensions" as an issue than had mentioned it during the campaign (an increase from 9 to 18 percent), whereas "defence and nuclear arms" dropped from 62 to 20 percent (p. 82). When respondents in the 1965 survey were asked to recall the issues of 1963, 10 percent said "pensions" but only 4 percent remembered "defence and nuclear arms" (p. 82).

After analyzing voters' opinions about the parties and leaders, Laponce examines how voters change allegiance to other parties. He begins by using CIPO data to show that in Canada generally a party can expect to lose between 5 and 20 percent of its electorate at each election. He then turns to his Burrard data to examine the pattern of electoral migrations between 1962 and 1965. Migrants followed one of three pathways. Temporary migrants switched and then returned to their original party, one-step migrants switched and remained with their new party, while two-step migrants supported a different party in each of three federal elections. Next Laponce investigates if voters follow an ideological continuum when they switch parties, preferring those parties closest to them on the continuum. He finds that the NDP-Liberal-Conservative-Social Credit ordering produces the most consistent pattern of changes but still does not account for between one quarter and one third of the transfers. He concludes the work by assessing the value of various socio-economic variables as indicators of partisanship, and shows which characteristics distinguish the supporters of each party.

Like the competent confessor, no reviewer examines a book and finds it without sin. The main weakness of this book involves explanation. While the author says much about which people vote or how they change parties, he says little about why they do so. Part of the blame rests with the sample size. For example, the small number of respondents makes it difficult to relate issue orientation to electoral migration in other than a cursory fashion. However, the author is also at fault.

Professor Laponce begins by stating that this work is essentially concerned with measurement, not with formulating and testing a theory, or with relating variables in a systematic experiment (p.x.). Throughout his work therefore, he introduces concepts through analogies or hypotheses and then presents relevant data. Unfortunately, however, the significance of the analogies is seldom pursued once the data is presented, and while the hypotheses are tested adequately, they explain little since they are not derived formally. Thus, while the author is concerned with measurement

rather than with theory, it is often difficult to assess what he is measuring. This is particularly true in his use of typologies where the conditions for classification tend to be arbitrary.

Despite these weaknesses however, the book is well worth reading. Students of Canadian politics will find it particularly valuable, not only for what it says about Canadians, but as an example of how to conduct significant research at the local level in a careful and inexpensive manner.—WALLACE D. GAGNE, *McMaster University*.

The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966. By C. S. WHITAKER, JR. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 563. \$13.50.)

The Politics of Tradition calls to mind Martin Landau's thoughtful critique of contemporary political science:

Restless, uncertain of direction, anxious about our status, we continue to reach out to other domains for concepts and images. Any new language suggestive of scientific yield bids fair to be transported into political science. Hence, it is difficult to fathom Robert A. Dahl's statement that 'the impact of the scientific outlook has been to stimulate caution, rather than boldness, in searching for broad, explanatory theories.' On the contrary, in the last fifteen years, we have transferred theories with a boldness that defies scientific caution. We have done exactly what Dahl has urged: we have introduced 'broad, bold, even highly vulnerable general theories,' as well as theories of lesser order. Those who embrace scientific perspectives have done this more explicitly; those who don't, more implicitly. Our problem, accordingly, is not a lack of theory—even general theory—but an abundance of theory. We possess such a vast number of theories, models, concepts, schemes, frames of reference (these are the terms we use) as to make one dizzy. But even more, all appear to be impregnable to the erosions of experience. They have enormous staying power: few, if any, are ever discarded. And when we become impatient over their limited yield, someone is sure to suggest another expedition into 'seemingly unrelated disciplines' to bring back 'new ways of looking at things' i.e., a new language. ("Due Process of Inquiry," *American Behavioral Scientist*, IX, 1965, p. 6.)

Perhaps the most striking examples of incautious borrowing from a cognate discipline can be found in "theories" and "models" which purport to explain sociopolitical change and modernization. The intellectual debt owed by Riggs and Apter, among many others, to the sociologists Weber, Tonnies, and Durkheim needs no elaboration here. It is sufficient to note that the payoff for political science continues to be meager, indeed. Why? C. S. Whitaker, Jr. addresses this question in his impressive case study of continuity and change in Northern Nigeria.

Whitaker enters two basic objections to the literature under discussion. First, he observes that theories and models of sociopolitical change tend to be organized around a concept whose applicability is not universal: modernization. According to the author, that concept rests on the problem-

atic assumption that societies undergoing substantial change are somehow destined to follow the "progressive" course of Westernization. Put differently, the concept of modernization bears the stigmas of evolutionary determinism and ethnocentric bias.

Second, Whitaker observed that the concept of modernization is frequently associated with a dichotomization of social characteristics which need not be mutually exclusive. Typically, dichotomized social characteristics—for example, achievement-ascription, specificity-diffuseness, and universalism-particularism—are arranged in a typology of "traditional" and "modern" societies; the error of reification is committed when nominally "ideal types" are made to subsume concrete cases. Whence came the image of mutually exclusive elements in contrasting "traditional" and "modern" societies? From ideal types propounded by the aforementioned sociologists, among others; traditional versus rational authority, *gemeinschaft* versus *gesellschaft* society, mechanical versus organic solidarity, and so forth. (It is worth noting here that sociologists and political scientists generally fail to heed the following rule pertaining to ideal types: since ideal types are intended to have an explanatory function, they must be treated as theoretical systems with empirically verifiable hypotheses. The familiar refrain that they are intended instead to illuminate divergence from empirical fact betrays unsound theory and methodological error. This point is discussed further in Carl Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, ed., *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1963, pp. 210-230.)

In sum, Whitaker rejects the notion of a necessary relationship between sociopolitical change and modernization. Moreover, he rejects the idea that an initial innovation must stimulate further innovation in a "eurhythmic" pattern. According to the author, notions of "eurhythmic" change and dichotomized social characteristics together produce the expectation that in the contact between Western and non-Western societies the latter will totally accept or reject modernity. He prefers a conceptualization of social change without reference to modernization, one that calls attention to the possibility of "creative adaptations to change, [i.e., to] action that succeeds in utilizing or manipulating new or alien elements to serve established ends and values (and vice versa)." (p. 12) Drawing on data from the emirate systems in Northern Nigeria, Whitaker argues persuasively that "a stable symbiosis of modern and traditional elements" (p. 467) is more likely to result from contact between Western and non-Western societies than a total displacement of traditionality by modernity.

Space limitations preclude a thorough examination of the data presented in *The Politics of Tra-*

diation. Accordingly, I would merely call attention to a section of the study which lends particularly strong support to the notion of "stable symbiosis": the chapter on "Popular Elections and *Neman Sarautu*." Therein Whitaker analyzes the complex process by which parliamentary government and popular elections were adapted to the traditional practice of *neman sarautu* (Hausa: "pursuit of office and title"). Indigenous elites, often educated in the Western manner, used the novel institutions (1) to defend class interests, and (2) to galvanize political competition for both traditional and "European" offices. Analogues to this situation can be found elsewhere in Nigeria. For example, my own research in Idoma revealed that popular elections introduced at the district level by the British were adapted to the traditional "game" of lineage competition for the clan headship.

I shall conclude by taking exception to one aspect of an otherwise solid book. In the final chapter, the author observes that ambivalence toward factors associated with modernity was reflected in the actions of Northern political leaders. Here is one example: in order to execute the social and political role expectations which were held for them, district heads and other high Native Authority officials were forced to violate the British norm of financial integrity; public funds were often used by these officials for private purposes. (p. 463)

Studies of role conflict in Subsaharan Africa are replete with similar cases. Unfortunately, neither previous investigators nor Whitaker probe the relationship between role conflict and ambivalence; indeed, they do not even define the latter concept. Their claims of leadership ambivalence are necessarily weakened by the lack of a conceptual definition and hard data. I have observed elsewhere that ambivalence—defined as difficulty in choosing behavior from among given role alternatives—need not accompany the perception of role conflict. Empirical data obtained by me in Idoma revealed the following: Native Authority officials experience far less ambivalence in role conflict situations involving factors associated with modernity than is generally assumed to be the case ("Methodological Considerations in the Study of African Political and Administrative Behavior: The Case of Role Conflict Analysis," *African Studies Review*, April 1970).—ALVIN MAGID, *State University of New York at Albany*.

India's Static Power Structure. BY J. D. SETHI. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969. Pp. 212. Rs 25.)

Professor Sethi is an economist trained at the L.S.E. and at present teaching at the Delhi School of Economics. His book is a casual and discursive

collection of essays on current Indian politics written for several leading Indian news magazines between 1966 and 1968. Unfortunately, the value of such a contribution depends largely on the extent of the author's "inside knowledge" of decision making and his ability to articulate his experience in concepts which are precise and current. Professor Sethi's analysis has the mark of an educated and informed newspaper reader but lacks the buttress of access or method and suffers as a consequence. Likewise, although he is familiar with much of the current scholarly literature, he is frequently enticed into an ideological idiom. The book is, nevertheless, interesting as an articulate indication of the response of India's urban intellectuals to the political events following Shastri's death.

The theme of Professor Sethi's book is stagnation in Indian politics. The stagnation to which he refers is the obvious decline in executive stability and authority in India since the 1967 elections and the consequent immobilization of governmental initiative. Symptoms of this immobilism are mentioned in passing as increased communal violence, economic crisis, fissiparous tendencies within the nation, and what he interprets as increasingly erratic governmental responses to a variety of problems from bank nationalization to allocations of grants to universities. The causes are to be found in the cultural betrayal of India's leading intellectuals and the venality of her politicians. The intellectual leaders of the nation have lost touch with their culture, its values and sentiments, and are ignorant of both the limitations and potential of their society. They have produced a "Nehruvian consensus" which is in essence Western and stand here accused of intellectual treason—of looking to the West rather than to their compatriots for meaning, approval, direction and money. The political parties, which might have been expected to resist these tendencies, have failed because the factionalism of self-seeking politicians has incapacitated them for their vital functions of linking elite and mass, evolving a true national consensus, institutionalizing autonomous executive leadership, and imposing normative restraints on the struggle for power. Indira Gandhi, Sethi argues, compounds her father's intellectual guilt by exacerbating his institutional decay. She has adopted, he explains, a deliberate strategy of destroying the only viable national political organization in India, the Congress Party, because she cannot control it. Her vicious attack on Morarji Desai, a major rival, concomitantly humiliated and alienated one of the few top leaders seriously committed to the party and national government as institutions. She has destroyed the integrity of the party with appeals to factions within the opposition parties in the name of "national consensus." She has weak-

ened the central government by wooing state leaders, the *quid pro quo* being justified by the principle of "decentralization." She has dissipated resources and stimulated insatiable demands by indulging in "populist" appeals to the masses. Her success will mean, he wrote several months before the Party split, the destruction of the Congress.

Sethi's preference, one hesitates to call it a solution, seems to be a xenophobic nationalism reminiscent of the thirties rather than the liberal internationalism of the Nehru tradition. Politically, he prefers a functional division of powers within the Indian federation with priorities and responsibilities clearly established by the central government. India's problems, he argues, can be solved only by strong leadership which keeps the nation's energies focused on economic growth through high investment rates. Concern over India's diversity and consumption needs is not unreasonable, it should merely be reduced to its proper proportions.

Sethi's arguments are not implausible, nor are they unique. In fact, in spite of his criticism, one would find these sentiments generally acceptable and frequently articulated within these same "intellectual" circles. His frustration is the fate of a nationalist middle class which has believed the myths of its nationalist leaders and now searches for the culprit who has destroyed natural community of sentiment and interest of the Indian people so widely proclaimed during the freedom struggle. Personally, Sethi has also, perhaps unconsciously, accepted the myths of western nationalism which hold up the socially integrated, culturally homogenous nations of Europe as a model for Asia and, intolerant of pluralism, he sees as a fatal flaw that diversity which may see as the essence and vitality of India's unique cultural tradition.

Sethi's frustration with the immobilism and factionalism of party politics is a recurrent theme among Indian intellectuals. It is unfortunate, however, that he did not bother to analyze the articulation between polity and economy so that one might better understand the precise areas most effected by political crisis. One is given the impression that nothing happens in India without government initiative and wonders, in consequence, about the origins of the "green revolution" amidst all this political confusion. Likewise, it is important to distinguish between elements of economic policy and elements of political expediency in the analysis of decision making as it is to distinguish the influence of economists and administrators from that of factional leaders.

Sethi's conclusion that Indian politics are bewildering and stagnant, expressed in the term "factionalism," is an all too common escape from rigorous analysis. In the first place, he either ignores or dismisses such concepts as "ruralization" or "sanskritization" as devices for ordering his data

and for translating factional confusion into aspects of structural change. Second, there is no mention of the rise of lower caste leaders to elite positions, the political decline of Brahmins or the entry of new regions into politics. Certainly, India's power structure cannot be considered static in the face of such momentous developments. Finally, institutional restraints on the factionalism of the party's recruitment process continue to operate. The influence of the civil service persists, non-factional paths are available to Ministerial posts, and highly independent Congress dignitaries occupy positions such as Governorships or directors of national industries. The spillover of factionalism into the actual process of decision-making has simply not been demonstrated.

One final point of interest, the volume is dedicated to the memory of C. Wright Mills.—NORMAN K. NICHOLSON, *Northern Illinois University, DeKalb.*

Science and Technology in British Politics. By NORMAN J. VIG. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968. Pp. 190. \$6.00.)

The content of this case study is largely addressed to the "science policy debate" that engaged Britain's major political parties during the period from 1959 to 1966. Relying upon government records, party documents, and forty interviews with leading political and administrative officials, the author has carefully addressed himself to two broad areas of concern: an account of the specific events that affected the emergence of "science policy" in Great Britain and an effort to see the entire phenomenon as a reflection of general political processes steeped in partisan difference and competition.

The emergence of science policy is handled in three chapters that deal (1) with a brief (but incisive) description of civil science programs before the Conservative Government of 1959-64 (2) with policy decisions on civil science by the Conservative Government of this period (3) and with recent attempts by the Labor Government to shift scientific and technological resources from military defense to applied civilian research production.

The author suggests that science policy matters prior to the Conservative Government of 1959-64 were complicated and intensified by several problems in science and technology that began to emerge during the aftermath of the Second World War, although many of them were rooted in older historical practices. Briefly stated, these problems centered around the shortage of scientific and technological manpower, the backward state of applied research and development in British industries, and the necessity to create new forms of government organization for planning and administering support for civil science and development.

The manpower shortage is attributed in large part to the reluctance of British universities to develop and stimulate scientific curricula and research opportunities until well into the 20th century. Yet even in those cases where pure science was found acceptable and research laboratories established, applied science and technology were regarded as inferior vocational or mechanical competences. Thus, a whole tradition of class bias and "classical" scholarship had to be mitigated before shortages in scientific and technological manpower could be approached as a serious matter of Government policy.

In British industries applied science and technology were also neglected—in some measure because of the educational pattern of the universities—but also because the English manufacturing system was built on industrial processes and management concepts that had their origin in the early industrial revolution. From this perspective basic scientific findings could scarcely be considered as important resources for industrial production and process innovation.

It was only in response to severe industrial shortages produced by the First World War that attention was drawn to the prospect of government support for increasing Britain's long-range economic capacity through scientific research and development. The main instrument for achieving this objective was the creation of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1916) which assumed responsibility for a number of operations: funding post-graduate work in basic research, allocating research monies for projects and equipment, stimulating industrial research through matching grants for cooperative Research Associations, and establishing and maintaining a network of State research institutions. The formal decision-making authority for the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was committed to the hands of a Privy Council Committee composed of ministers from departments with related interests. But in practice it was loosely supervised by the Lord President of the Council who was responsible to Parliament. Informal direction and encouragement was given to the Department by an advisory council consisting of representatives from the universities, industry, and government.

While the decision-making activities that surrounded the DSIR and its advisory panels became the basic administrative pattern for civil research into the 1960's, there were other forms of government organization that shared as well in the cultivation of scientific research. The Medical Research Council (1919) and the Agricultural Research Council (1931) were each founded to promote and coordinate rather specific scientific concerns, but in neither instance was a separate department created. They were operated instead un-

der the Lord President and a system of advisory councils similar to those of the DSIR. Moreover, there were a number of administrative and service departments that maintained research facilities prior to the Second World War, such as the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, Fuel and Power, Health, the Post Office, the Colonial Office, the Admiralty (oceanography) and the Air Ministry (meteorology).

This decentralized and largely autonomous pattern of civil science was directly affected by the exigencies produced by the Second World War. Scientists and other professionals were drawn into government administration and research programs were developed (particularly atomic energy and aviation research) that would heavily influence post-war policy. And yet, in general, the wartime application of science was focused on short range goals and lacked sufficient organizational mechanisms to make it a coherent area for overall policy determination.

By 1959 the failure to "modernize" essential industries and to give British commerce a competitive edge forced the Conservative Government to consider additional means through which science could be brought to bear upon national economic policy. Yet the activities of the Conservative Government were limited. It created a new Minister for Science and accepted the utility of the civil development contract. But its operational policies as well as its announced political commitment were against detailed government control and planning for science.

The present Labour Government, however, has shown a disposition to the contrary. It has tried to shift scientific resources from defense to civilian production and in the process has created new forms of government organization for coordinating science-related policies. The Ministry of Technology, for example, which was created by the Labour Government is now being converted into a far more powerful Ministry of Industry for extending control over a wide range of industrial engineering. Moreover, manpower needs in science and technology are being met by incorporating Colleges of advanced Technology into the university sector, and programs are underway for sponsoring industries in computer and machine tool production. But despite this increased activity, the author is insistent that a "national science policy" does not yet exist in Great Britain—in terms of a systematic, costed and budgeted plan for all phases of science-related Government investment.

The second broad concern to which the book is addressed deals with the circumstances that permitted science policy to be exploited as a partisan political issue. Five chapters are devoted to a discussion of the major participants (parties, Parliament, and interest groups) that sought to articu-

late a national position for the development of science and technology. It is very much to the author's credit that he has explored the external political dimensions of science and brought his analytical facilities to bear on the emergence of science as an instrument of national political purpose. This aspect of science reflects perhaps the most important characteristic of all post-industrial societies—the general collapse of meaningful distinctions between the public and private realms, between sustained support for an autonomous science and the realization that national goals may require the extended use of scientific resources. As the author points out, the participants in the “science policy debate” did not disagree over the political ends to which science might be subjected, but rather over the pace and means by which they might be accomplished.

Science and Technology in British Politics is a work rich in detail, with due caution exercised over what may be inferred from the events described. It will be useful for anyone concerned with comparative science policy or who wishes to speculate about the relation of science to society. My only disappointment (a purely idiosyncratic one) is that the author did not choose to explore what the “politicization” of science might mean for the conduct of scientific inquiry—how it might influence the selection of relevant areas of research or perhaps even the evaluation of scientific evidence itself. But surely an author has the right to establish the parameters of his study, and within the limits imposed upon the present work, Professor Vig has given a competent and worthwhile performance.—MARLAN BISSETT, *Purdue University*.

Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model.

BY STEPHEN S. COHEN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 310. \$3.50.)

Although the development of French planning has generated an abundance of studies and research, its political aspects have often remained unexamined. This book addresses itself, in part, towards meeting this need. To the extent that it does so, it is possibly the best book on French planning currently available to English-speaking political scientists.

French planning works, the author points out, because of its non-coercive approach. The planners seek to achieve their objects largely through dispensing information and incentives. In the latter category, are such items as cheap investment capital, accelerated depreciation allowances, special tax reductions and outright grants. Consequently, while French businessmen accepted planning only as an alternative to nationalization, many of them have since become outright enthusiasts.

The planners, notes Cohen, have also shown po-

litical adroitness at keeping opposition to a minimum. The Planning Commission has purposely remained small and acts chiefly “as a broker among power groups, of which big business and the Ministry of Finance are by far the most important.” Another helpful factor has been the emergence of a new breed of *hauts fonctionnaires* who have been intensively and broadly educated at France's post-war *École Nationale d'Administration*. They bring to their jobs a broad perspective of the national interest as well as an “old boy” network of mutual school associations which helps overcome inter-agency rivalry and distrust.

These new bureaucrats see themselves as representing the general interest, a concept which, Cohen says, is “straight out of Rousseau.” Indeed, it is. However, political theorists will also see a good deal of Saint-Simon in this technocratic meritocracy.

When it comes to the actual mechanics of planning, Cohen makes clear that the various “modernization” commissions, to say nothing of the Economic and Social Council, are not usually the main levers of action. It is more customary for top level bureaucrats to reach an accord with a key industry leader and for the latter to get his colleagues in line. Sometimes no agreement is reached and the industry or any of its members will undertake projects without the government's approval. However, the fact that the planners can offer incentives and the fact that they usually share a common background with business leaders keeps disagreements to a minimum.

Trade unions, small businesses and other groups play only a minimal role in the planning process but, at least to some degree, this is their own fault. Not only do trade unions, for example, often not possess the expertise to make a solid contribution but their leaders, particularly those who are Communists, are hostile to the whole planning process. The same factors partly explain Parliament's inability to play a significant role in planning. The non-Communist left tried to slash military expenditures and increase consumer spending and investment in the Fifth Plan in 1964, but the Communists withheld their support. As a result, the “counter plan” fell through and the stage was set for the “events of May” in 1968.

Although Cohen does take note of these and other political developments, political scientists may wish for more data and analysis of the impact of planning on party policies, political campaigns, interest group activity, etc. Furthermore, even when it comes to discussing the way planning is carried out within the bureaucracy and in the bureaucracy's relations with business, his book lacks the detail and specifics needed to see the actual workings of the process.

Some may also quarrel with Cohen's contention

that economic planning must inevitably make France into a "corporatist" democracy with no possibility of any significant redistribution of economic power. The participation movement is currently gaining ground in France as well as other European countries, and as knowledge workers replace industrial workers, this trend may acquire increasing momentum. Cohen's own material indicates that a less revolutionary and more reformist trade union movement could wield much more influence over a plan's formulation and execution.

Cohen's book raises, at least in this reviewer's mind, some questions regarding our own discipline. Political Science has produced its share of books on the ill-fated Fourth Republic, but few, if any, of these works have devoted more than cursory attention to what appears to have been the Republic's most significant governmental contribution. Has Political Science become so preoccupied with some elements of the political process that it is neglecting others?

Political Science has also made increasing use of sociological data in recent years. In the light of Cohen's book, the question arises if it is not time to start devoting more thought to economic interrelationships as well?

Finally, the study of Comparative Public Administration has been flourishing of late. But, since it is mainly concerned with cross-cultural comparisons, its scholars have tended to devote their efforts to studying under-developed nations and other countries unlike our own. Cohen's book makes one wonder whether it might not be time to channel more academic energy into studying industrialized lands so that American scholarship may yield more ideas as to how the American polity can cope with its own rising tide of politico-economic problems?—GEORGE E. BERKLEY, *North-eastern University*.

The Government and Politics of Tibet. By RAM RAHUL. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969. Pp. 160. Rs. 20.)

This book gives brief accounts of the political history of Tibet, the structure of the Lhasa government before the Chinese Communist takeover, and the place of Tibet in the politics of Asia. The author claims—a claim supported by The Fourteenth Dalai Lama in a "Foreword"—that his is the first book to appear on the subject.

The author's subject, however, has several aspects. The history of Tibet and accounts of its relations with the great powers have been treated more thoroughly in numerous works. The social base of the Tibetan political system has been covered more comprehensively by Carrasco, although he had only secondary sources. What is new in Professor Rahul's book is a reasonably detailed description of the principal offices of the Lhasa

government and of their formal functions and powers, and suggestions regarding the political power of various elements of the polity, such as the monasteries, the nobility, and the highest lamas. The combination of this new material with the historical summaries produces an interesting and original introduction to the government and politics of Tibet.

For readers familiar with other "traditional" political societies—roughly, literate agrarian societies with low levels of technology—the material on governmental organization and political power will be suggestive and should help them gain perspective on the political life of traditionalism. This material, however, is too limited to provide more than hints about how the Lhasa government itself really worked, where power really lay, and what policies the government actually pursued. For example, the author says that the Dalai Lama "has full power over the country in all matters, and his work is absolute law" (p. 10), yet he also reports that from the seventeenth to the twentieth century no Dalai Lama lived for more than twenty-three years, that there were extended periods (such as from 1933 until 1950) when the Dalai Lama was a minor political figure and the government directed by a regent, and that even the great Fifth Dalai Lama periodically and for years at a time devoted himself "exclusively to religious affairs" (p. 11). An autocracy frequently without its autocrat requires explanation. Of special importance is the relationship between the religious and political roles of the Dalai Lama, a relationship the author does not examine.

Since, however, the Lhasa regime in its pre-Communist form has disappeared forever, any information on it is welcome. Professor Rahul should be encouraged to turn his attention to those official documents that were brought from Tibet and to former officials of the regime in order to discover what the Dalai Lama's government did, the methods it used, and the goals of its actions.—C. W. CASSINELLI, *University of Washington*.

The Christian Democratic Party in Chile: A Study of Political Organization and Activity with Primary Emphasis on the Local Level. By GILES WAYLAND-SMITH. (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centre Intercultural de Documentación, 1969. Pp. 314.)

In the 1960's, Christian Democracy surged forth as a dynamic alternative to the traditional, Cuban, and Nasserist military approaches to governance. Above all, its remarkable electoral success in Chile in 1964 and 1965 seemed to some observers to presage a continent-wide movement of major proportions. Whatever the ultimate verdict on that score—and it is somewhat dim at this writing—an outpouring of publications focused on the Chilean

phenomenon. In large measure, they concentrated their attention on the PDC's national organization, doctrine, and performance level in government.

While not ignoring the national context in this study, Professor Wayland-Smith has chosen to stress the otherwise largely neglected local party units by probing Cristian Democratic organization, goals, recruitment process, and performance levels in three Santiago communes. His data was compiled by interviews and by the use of a questionnaire; his analytical approach is broadly structural-functional.

Three preliminary chapters ably trace the rise of the Christian Democratic party in Chile, its ideological tenets, and the political environment of the Santiago communes the author has taken for his sample: lower class Conchalí, mostly middle class Nuñoa, and well-to-do Las Condes. In this regard, it is to the author's credit that he offers sharp images of the visual features and life styles of each commune so that the empirical evidence that follows is located in recognizable settings.

Politically, all three communes comprise a cross section of Chile's multiparty electorate, with the Christian Democratic percentage of voters being almost identical in each commune. The PDC's local organizational strength built up gradually during the 1950's and 1960's at a time when the other parties suffered from weaker communal organizations—a significant factor in Eduardo Frei's electoral triumph in 1964.

Although the communal parties clearly are creatures of the national PDC organization, they also reflect in structure, membership composition, and attitudinal patterns the individual nature of each commune. Thus, in its organizational form, Nuñoa represents almost an ideal local grouping in terms of what is called for by the party's bylaws. It is highly developed, its headquarters serving as a regular meeting place for all kinds of Christian Democrats in the area—and strong ties have been forged between local leadership and the bases. In contrast, Las Condes constitutes more of a paper organization with a leadership nucleus and virtually no structural bases. Conchalí falls in between the other two communes in its structural makeup. This diversity also exists in doctrinal orientations. All recognize the same general goals for restructuring Chilean society, though the lower class areas prefer immediate, tangible ones, while the middle classes' attachments are more toward global and futuristic achievements.

When considering socio-economic characteristics, Christian Democrats rank "above average" in education, religious commitment, occupational standing, and income, though individual communes vary according to certain criteria (e.g., a higher percentage of women adhere to the PDC in

the poorest commune than in the others). The somewhat elitist nature of Christian Democratic membership—mostly middle class but not wealthy—conduces to "a communality of interest and perspective which yields both cross-communal social cohesion and an internal pressure tending to reinforce the specifically ideological and radical contours of the party" (pp. 5/14-15).

In general, the communal parties' activities are similar, but they differ in emphases. Conchalí carries on many service functions, focuses heavily on organizing mass rallies, and relies on a highly pragmatic style. The Las Condes grouping stresses electoral matters, focuses on inner-directed activities that reinforce membership commitments, and is globally ideological in style. Nuñoa stresses service activities and is mixed in its focus and style.

Wayland-Smith concludes that whereas lower class groups can be kept more or less satisfied with the PDC if they feel their claims are reaching the government and a few tangible benefits materialize, middle class elements owe their allegiance to the PDC primarily for ideological reasons rather than for personal gains. As a consequence, they "may undergo a period of waning commitment if global goals become mechanical or subverted or if a sense of emergency declines" (p. 7/12). Although the author does not deal with the factionalism which plagued the Christian Democrats during the last years of Frei's regime, his thesis helps to explain this occurrence. Finally, he suggests that the Christian Democrats, like the Marxist parties, have successfully brought lower class elements into the political system and cultivated working class leadership to sustain the organizational bases. However, in contradistinction to the Marxist parties, the Christian Democrats' political socialization and professionalization of the lower classes has established "a certain foundation for the development of a political system in which conflict leads not to open rebellion but rather to a more equitable and peaceful accommodation of opposing interests" (pp. 7/16-17).

Professor Wayland-Smith has produced an unusual and thoughtful book. He is quick to point out occasional limitations in his data which cause some findings to be suggestive rather than definitive. Still, other research—including that of this reviewer—tend to support his conclusions. Certainly, some interesting and important new dimensions of the Chilean Christian Democratic party are provided in this fine study.—BEN G. BURNETT, *Whittier College*.

The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon. By CALVIN A. WOODWARD. (Providence: Brown University Press, 1969. Pp. 338. \$8.50.)

When independence came to Ceylon, many people tended to see Ceylon as an example of what

were considered to be the positive aspects of British colonialism. The island seemed prosperous and the problems associated with high rates of population growth such as unemployment, pressure on the land and demands for services such as education did not diminish the euphoria of freedom. Eventually, the euphoria vanished and the problems remained.

Ceylon's problems are very much like those of any developing state; Ceylon, according to Professor Woodward, "has made the transition to self-rule perhaps better than any other new state." Among the factors responsible for this happy state of affairs are "competent and dedicated leaders" and a "responsible party system." Professor Woodward analyzes the origins and growth of this party system in the work reviewed here.

The history of Ceylon's party system precedes independence. The Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was formed in 1919 for the purpose of articulating the interests of non-revolutionary Ceylonese nationalists. The CNC's goals were constitutional change and its style was gradualist. While communal differences are usually de-emphasized in the *ad hoc* character of an independence movement, the moderate program of the CNC was not sufficiently compelling to submerge these differences. The CNC fragmented along communal lines. This fragmentation was the beginning and indicated the direction of Ceylon's party system.

Parties contested the 1931 election for seats on the State Council but its structure mitigated against the growth of political parties. However, independence was the real stimulus to parties and, according to Professor Woodward, from independence to the present, change is the outstanding characteristic of Ceylon's party system.

Immediately after independence, the political parties were organizations of notables. Parties offered little basis for popular identification other than the notables they could attract to run on their tickets. Because the parties had so little to offer potential candidates, there were a great many independent candidates and there was very little party discipline. The election of 1947 was contested mainly on the basis of personality. Identification with a major party apparently did not seem necessary as over half of the candidates (some 180) ran either as independents or as representatives of minor parties. None of the major parties returned over half of their candidates. The United National Party (UNP) which had hoped for a majority, nevertheless, earned a popular vote plurality. Because of this and its organizational strength, the UNP became the center of the coalition government. The UNP formed a government of comprehensive character. Unfortunately, the consensus achieved under the UNP was vague at best and never included Tamil or Marxist parties. Professor

Woodward notes that from the perspective of the UNP, the great danger was that the Opposition seemed more revolutionary than loyal.

From 1947 to 1952, the parties underwent a period of self-definition and organizational development. The 1952 election was more party oriented than any previous one. The parties contested the election of 1952 more as organized units than previously. The UNP won a majority and was able to govern alone. Professor Woodward attributes the UNP victory to a fragmented Opposition, among other things.

After 1952, it was clear that the Opposition had to forge some type of unity if they were to replace the UNP as the government. At the same time, the UNP social base was eroding through neglect and this was to be the strength of the Opposition. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a former UNP minister and founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), a Sinhalese socialist party, combined his party with Philip Gunawardena's Viplavakari Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP), a Marxist party, the Bhasa Peramuna, a communal organization, and a group of independents to form the Peoples' United Front (MEP). This electoral coalition capitalized on the UNP's social neglect and became the government.

The MEP could not maintain its electoral unity and by the 1960 elections, it was in disarray. This situation was a revival of the 1947 and 1952 elections where the Left was fragmented. Although the results of the election were indecisive, forcing another election, the UNP had made a comeback. In the second 1960 election, the SLFP emerged as the majority party.

At this point, it was apparent that Ceylon's party system was a viable one. The parties were capable of providing alternative governments, power was transferred in an orderly manner, oppositions learned to work together and after the 1965 election which the UNP won, the system had evidenced capacity for parties' comebacks.

Analysis of the events outlined above leads Professor Woodward to a strong admiration for Ceylon's party system's adaptive capabilities. He characterizes the system as multiparty and bipolar.

Professor Woodward's functional view of parties is the basis for his Replacement Theory of Party Growth. The Replacement Theory holds that parties are first formed as notables' vehicles to public office and the political ambitions of the notables are the main impetus to party growth. The growth of a party may be measured by the extent to which it is able to replace notables as the viable political unit.

Because the theory is inductively derived, it may have no application beyond Ceylon. More importantly, it is not fully adequate to explain Ceylonese party politics for at least two reasons.

First, it does not deal with charisma. There does not seem room under the rubric of the theory for the emergence of a charismatic leader in an established party system. Indeed, the teleology of the Replacement Theory would seem to forbid a charismatic leader. Second, the concern with party growth as a function of notables' ambitions merely implies the importance of social groups' demands. To emphasize the ambitions of notables at the expense of social demands is to deny the influence of the broader social system on the subsystem studied.

The utility of the Replacement Theory is as an ordering device, which adds a new perspective to our understanding of Ceylon's party system. The strength of the book is the description, based upon extensive research, of Ceylonese political parties and their interactions. This is the task Professor Woodward has set for himself and he has done it.—KENNETH H. ESCH, *University of Hawaii*.

Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. By ELEIZER BE'ERI. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. Pp. 51. \$9.50.)

Of the important Arab States of today, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Iraq have "military regimes." The remainder—Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia continue to be governed by civilians; but only Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are governed without overt support from the military establishments. Tunisia's successful reliance on its One Party, and Saudi Arabia's reliance on a fragmented tribal system have assured both states a tranquility denied the rest of the Arab states. To varying extents, the Army plays critical roles in upholding the regimes in Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco. It may be conjectured that within the very near future these too are likely to follow the path charted by other Arab regimes and succumb to the military. Should Tunisia fail to weather the test of succession to the Presidency once its ailing President removes himself from the political arena and Saudi Arabia is freed from the firm grip of its chief balancer—King Faisal—the odds are that they both will be "ripe" for the intervention of the military in politics.

To suggest that there is a certain degree of ripeness in an Arab society that makes intervention by the military likely is to run counter to one and perhaps the major thesis advanced by Mr. Be'eri, namely, that developmental requirements have little to do with bringing about military coups. His work in large measure is devoted to refuting a thesis long nurtured by Arab militarists and faithfully echoed by Western scholars that, given the social and economic conditions of the contemporary Arab world, the incompetence of the civilian systems, and the disillusionment with the limited practice of constitutional government,

eventual seizure of power by the military establishment is inevitable. Mr. Be'eri quotes former President Abbud of the Sudan who upon seizing power in 1958, claimed that his coup was "natural" because the evolution of society requires at the helm a committed and competent group with sufficient discipline and cohesion to translate to reality the vision long held by the advanced ranks of the intelligentsia and radicals of a better Arab society. In one form or another, all previous writers on the intervention of the military in Arab politics have accepted the validity of this hypothesis and have maintained that the peculiar character, training and social and economic origins of the military officers make them highly suitable agents for disciplined social and economic change.

Not only does Mr. Be'eri subject this thesis to serious examination but his examination ranges widely and minutely over the course of recent Arab political history; he seeks to prove that the intervention of the military long predated radicalisation of Arab politics, or any concern and commitment to constructive social and political change. Thirty-one chapters, in six parts, to which are added two appendices, ought to provide the reader not only with a history of the successful as well as unsuccessful military coups but also with useful information on Arab politics in general and some comparative material on the intervention of the military in Latin America and other areas. The careful and patient reader will come out with a detailed if confused picture of the rationale of the military intervention in Arab politics; whether or not he is also persuaded that the intervention is primarily motivated by personal struggles for power rather than by concrete social and economic forces, he will be grateful for the abundance of the information provided. The reader will also learn much about the politics of the Arab states as these are perceived by a Marxist-Zionist scholar.

Mr. Be'eri, for example, examines minutely the achievements of the Free Officers in Egypt in terms of the liberation of the country from foreign control, industrialization, agrarian reform, etc. The reader is given enough information on other military regimes in Syria or Iraq to compare their achievements with those of the Free Officers in Egypt. Whether he will conclude, as Mr. Be'eri did, that their achievements are not as significant as their proponents claim is another matter. But Mr. Be'eri considers the limited achievements of the military regimes as one more reason for questioning the "natural" course theory of Arab politics. One of the principal rationales of military intervention is that the military can and did do more for social and economic change than previous civilian regimes. When Mr. Be'eri measures them against their own claims, the military regimes are found wanting.

The reader is left with two principal suggestions to ponder. On the one hand Mr. Be'eri's thesis is that the Arab world has had its experience with militarism—and a not very good one at that—largely because of its Islamic heritage. It seems that, since all other “explanations” of the intervention of the military in politics have been disproven empirically, then the most obvious one must be the cultural explanation. Previous writers have been equally unconvincing in suggesting this as the explanation. And second, the intervention of the military has essentially succeeded in ushering in or continuing a tendency towards fascist-like systems which, according to Mr. Be'eri, more accurately characterize Arab regimes. The left-wing rhetoric of the regimes of the Ba'th, or for that matter of Arab socialism, merely disguises fascist-like systems. Of course this too is open to serious question.

Mr. Be'eri disarms his readers at the beginning by admitting that, as an Israeli, he might not be able to write on Arab politics objectively; he also questions whether objectivity in such cases is possible or feasible. One does not have to argue the case on theoretical grounds. It is obvious that the Arab-Israeli chasm has deprived Israeli writers on Arab politics of the opportunity to appreciate the true dimensions of change in Arab society and institutions that in large measure have been effected by the military regimes. Behind the facade of authoritarian control of the center, more grass roots institutional change and participation in politics have occurred over the past two decades than in the previous century. If there is a ferment today in the Arab mind and among the intellectuals, such a ferment is in part to be attributed to the achievements of the military systems in terms of altering the social and economic structures of Arab society. That classes have not been broken and that an actual revolution by the peasants and workers has not taken place may be a question of time only. When they do occur, their appearance will have been substantially facilitated by the advent to power of the military officers. No amount of interviewing of prisoners of war, irrespective of rank, or reading of documentary accounts by an intelligence service, are adequate substitutes for a true knowledge of the complex processes of change that have been taking place in the Arab world. The failure of Israeli intelligence to assess properly the reaction of the Arab people to the June 1967 war alerts us to the fact that their inadequate understanding of the social and political bases of Arab society contrast very sharply with their correct appreciation of the military-technical situation. To rely on their documentation as Mr. Be'eri does leads to strange and in many ways obsessed conclusions.—IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD, *Northwestern University*.

Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation. BY G. ANDREW MAGUIRE. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. 393. \$13.50.)

This book treats the men and events which shaped the coming of independence in Sukumaland, a tribal region in northwestern Tanzania. It covers the period from 1945 to 1965; years which encompass profound changes in Tanzanian politics. A unique feature of this study is its analysis of this change from the viewpoint of the Sukuma people, the single largest tribal grouping in Tanzania. The two decades considered here include the heyday of British efforts to direct development in Sukumaland, the emergence of indigenous resistance to these efforts, the achievement of independence, and, finally, the transition from an anti-colonial movement to a party responsible for governing the nation.

In his treatment of the first decade of political ferment in Sukumaland, Maguire analyzes the alliance which develops between African elites in the towns and discontented farmers in the rural areas and documents the importance of the rural areas in the move toward national independence. The author's treatment of British plans for promoting rural development in Sukumaland stresses the influence of individual colonial officers in the direction of local development plans and suggests the impracticality of many of these projects. In reaction to these efforts, often involving compulsion, the peasants became supporters of the urban African politicians. Significantly, Maguire shatters the neat, but frayed, traditional-modern formula for studying political change in the developing areas by showing that the anti-colonial politicians included individuals from all ranks of Sukuma society and that traditional political institutions had virtually no influence or impact on the nationalist movement. He documents the conflict between the British-maintained native authorities and the aspiring elites and shows that the emergence of the native authority system under British tutelage was in itself a violation of the traditional role of the chief in Sukuma society. Its untenable position between British authority and African society ultimately led to its emasculation before the drive of the new politicians for democratic self-government.

A detailed analysis of the development of the cooperative movement demonstrates the ties between town and village in the emergence of anti-colonial sentiment in Sukumaland. Of particular interest is the author's conclusion, conflicting with earlier studies, that the cooperative movement played no appreciable political role in the drive to independence. Although there was considerable overlap of interests, membership, and leaders between the social and political organizations and

the cooperative movement, the latter limited itself, by mutual agreement, exclusively to the problems of cooperative development. This was especially the case after political activities were banned in late 1954.

Maguire shows that nationalist politics in Sukumaland predated the party of independence, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), by at least ten years, and traces in detail the rise, decline and transition of TANU's predecessors including the Sukuma Union and the Tanganyika African Association. He includes a particularly effective treatment of the trauma of TANU's transition from anti-colonial movement to the governing party as perceived from the villages of Sukumaland. After documenting the disaffection of local people with the often callous methods of local party officials, the author shows the effort of national officials to deal with this dissatisfaction by encouraging competition within the single-party system. The effectiveness of this effort in Sukumaland is demonstrated by the fact that prominent local TANU officials were defeated in the 1965 election and not one of the area's seven incumbent members of the national legislature was returned, including the important Sukuma cooperative leader, Government Minister and TANU stalwart, Paul Bomani.

Maguire skillfully intermingles data from official records and interviews to create colorful portraits of personalities involved in the move toward Uhuru in Sukumaland. This technique for interpreting events influenced by both expatriate officer and African leader puts individuals—particularly the often unseen middle and local level official—back into the study of political change and shows how the personalities of these officials often became the most important factor determining policy directions. A survey shows sixty-three such sketches in the book; twenty-five of which are quite detailed. Of these twenty-five, sixteen are clearly middle level and local, rather than national. Of these sixteen, five were TANU opponents during this period. The study thus also considers those neglected individuals who, though figuring prominently, do not survive in the highly competitive arena of African politics. While others may question Maguire's interpretation of all these personalities, this technique has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the work.

Most Africanists will agree with Maguire's plea for detailed case studies as the necessary next step toward a fuller understanding of African politics. Few scholars are likely, however, to succeed as admirably as he has here. It is not that others may not possess the scholarly skills of the author; considerable as this study proves them to be. Rather the massive amount of grass-roots data upon which the study is based—constituting one of the

most impressive features of the book—is due in some degree to good fortune. Considering the atmosphere in which the social scientist must today work in much of Africa and the simple passage of the first stages of independence and development, it is unlikely that future scholars will be so successful in securing information, access to participating individuals and in experiencing vicariously the transition from colonial rule to independence which was the opportunity of the author. The finished product is a credit to the officials who facilitated this research and to the author who has so skillfully prepared this study.

Two mild criticisms may be made. The Local Government Service Commission was to begin appointing Divisional Executive Officers in early 1969, not 1965 as noted in the book, and the author fails to note that all of Julius Nyerere's major writings, treated in some detail here, are available in collections considerably more accessible than the sources cited in the bibliography. These are, however, minor quibbles to a book which is a must for students of African politics and political change.—Clyde R. Ingle, SUNY College of Arts and Science, Geneseo.

Partier og erhverv: Studier i partiorganisation og byerhvervenes politiske aktivitet 1880-1913. By VAGN DYBDAHL. (Aarhus, Denmark: Erhvervsarkivet, Universitetsforlaget i Aarhus, 1969. Vol. I, Pp. 406; Vol. II, Pp. 235. 90 D. Kr.)

The emergence of political science as an autonomous and vital academic discipline has followed an uneven pattern of development in Scandinavia. For the most part, Denmark has trailed far behind Sweden, Finland, and Norway in the production of systematic empirically-based political studies. Happily, the gap now appears to be narrowing. In 1959, an Institute of Political Science was established at Aarhus University. Already, several volumes which draw on the Institute's growing data bank have been issued, with several others in various stages of preparation. Vagn Dybdahl's book, while not a product of the Institute, deserves to be considered as a suitable and worthy companion piece to these publications. Indeed, Dybdahl's work, which is in reality a pre-defense printing of his doctoral dissertation, can easily be seen as a link between the practices of the past, when the study of governmental affairs was parceled out and submerged within the economics, law and history curricula, and the present aspirations underlying the newly liberated field of Danish political science.

The general task to which the author addresses himself is to explore the patterns of interaction between the various urban-based economic interests and the political system, with special attention given to the political behavior and influence

of the merchant and artisan groupings. The perspective from which Dybdahl has chosen to view the matter is a historical one. Utilizing a scheme which conceptualizes the political parties as the vital representational links between societal interests and the centers of governmental decision-making, he restricts his investigation to the period 1880-1913, when the modern Danish party system was going through its formative and consolidative stages. Principal attention is confined to the two major "city parties," the Social Democrats and the Right or Conservative Party (*Højre*). Thus, Dybdahl's specific purpose is to examine the character and shape of the ties between the new political organizations and the various urban electorates at a time when these bonds are initially being forged.

If the study's historical thrust serves to establish its linkage with the classical mold, the manner in which Dybdahl has gone about his work certainly earns for the book the right to stand among the products of the more modern school of Danish political science. Not content to depend exclusively upon information taken from secondary sources, the author has fashioned his work from a formidable array of original data, much of it quantitative, gleaned from both public and private archives.

One illustration of this is Dybdahl's ingenious use of public election lists. These rolls, which contained the names of all enfranchised males together with their occupations, were frequently used for purposes of recording and tabulating individual voting choices in the period prior to the introduction of the secret ballot in 1901. Unfortunately, adequate lists are preserved only for the Copenhagen and Aarhus areas and then only for scattered elections and constituencies—ten lists in all. To his credit, Dybdahl is quick to recognize and warn of the limitations inherent in employing such scanty evidence. From this fragmentary material, however, he is able to construct for all of the major urban occupational groupings a series of fascinating participatory and partisan profiles which collectively span the two decades immediately preceding the turn of the century.

Strikingly visible, for example, is the rising involvement of the working class in the nation's political life: In 1881 only fourteen percent of the eligible blue collar voters in Copenhagen's First Election District exercised their franchise, the lowest level of activism exhibited by any group. However, according to the preserved list from the Third District of Copenhagen County, by 1898 workers were voting in that constituency at a rate approaching eight in ten—78.8%—far ahead of the other occupational electorates.

Bringing aggregate data into play, Dybdahl also demonstrates the progressive urbanization of the Conservative Party under the impact of the Danish industrial revolution. Initially a party with a

balance of rural and urban support, the Conservatives increasingly found their partisans concentrated in the larger cities. Thus, Dybdahl estimates that by 1913 about seventy-five percent of the party's voters were urban dwellers.

The full range of insights produced by the author's incisive mining of a veritable mountain of source material is simply too great to mention here. Suffice it to say that in addition to probing the voting behavior of the urban population, the study focuses on three other broad areas of interest:

- 1) An investigation is conducted into the occupational backgrounds of the candidates nominated for the *Folketing*, the popularly elected lower chamber, between 1876 and 1913. Among other things, Dybdahl uncovers a marked disparity between the occupational composition of the parties' candidate groups and that of their respective voting publics. Generally speaking, working class individuals and urban tradesmen were consistently underrepresented among Social Democratic and Conservative nominees. A similar analysis is also applied to the members of the now defunct upper house, the *Landsting*, for the period 1866-1910.

- 2) Dybdahl then takes a searching look at the organizational, leadership, and program development of the Conservative and Social Democratic Parties from their respective inception through the outbreak of the First World War. He points out that, in contrast with the patterns found in most other European contexts, the Danish Conservative Party developed an extensive network of branch organizations more or less simultaneously with its consolidation as a parliamentary party. Of interest is the fact that manual workers made up a large share of the membership in the local Conservative Associations and Clubs which flourished in the 1880's. In the 1890's, however, the number of branches and their membership began to tail off sharply as the parliamentary struggle between the Conservatives and Liberal Party cooled and, it is to be suspected, as the organizational élan of the Social Democratic Party made itself felt among the lower classes. Although both the Social Democrats and Conservatives were dependent on the urban centers for their electoral sustenance, shopkeepers, artisans and similar self-employed tradesmen were, as was the case with the candidate groups, poorly represented on the ruling councils of both parties.

- 3) The relatively weak and divided political position of the urban petty bourgeoisie is one of the central themes developed by the author in his final substantive chapter. The vehicle for Dybdahl's efforts to probe the actual dynamics of the policy-making process is a case study of

the attempts launched in the early 1890's to promulgate a revised Trade Act. At this time, many shopkeepers and artisans were particularly interested in limiting access to trading licenses and securing protection against private chain operations and consumer cooperatives. Yet, a draft bill introduced first in 1893 which would have tightened the existing regulations repeatedly died in committee until it was dropped from the agenda in about 1900. In part, its fate was shaped by the ambivalent position taken by the Conservatives who, torn between a positive artisan wing and a negative free trade-industrial wing, gave only moderate and uncertain support to the measure. The Social Democrats were in much the same boat. While they were desirous of wooing the small tradesman vote, their enthusiasm was counterbalanced by a wish not to alienate the urban cooperative movement for which the party had a certain ideological and in some cases organizational affinity.

In each chapter Dybdahl musters an abundance of documentary and statistical material which serves to give his analysis depth and authenticity. So rich is this lode that a supplementary volume in which the author has collected his detailed data contains nearly 130 pages of tables, charts, and the like.

Some weaknesses are detectable. An English translation of the summary chapter, which is also included in the second volume, is rather poorly done. At one point, Dybdahl appears to have misconstrued the "cross-pressure hypothesis" and thus his contention that it is not supported by his findings is a questionable one. These are minor flaws, however, which scarcely detract from the value of the work. All in all, it is an impressive addition to the small but growing library of Danish political studies and one which students of the country's governmental affairs will undoubtedly welcome and use for years to come.—KENNETH S. PEDERSEN, *San Diego State College*.

Die Deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des National-Sozialismus. BY KARL DIETRICH BRACHER. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969. Pp. 580. \$10.00.)

Professor Bracher of the University of Bonn has written a study of political mobilization, which should interest students of general comparative politics as well as modern European history. The twin engines of propaganda and organization provided the driving force of the National Socialist movement, and their study rightly serves as the unifying theme of this important book. Although the treatment of ideology both as a system of values and as a basis for mobilization is vital, the study appears to be lacking in balance, for ideology receives relatively little attention. The author

describes National Socialist beliefs in the traditional manner by stressing that they were a potpourri of wholly negative appeals to anti-semitism, anti-parliamentarianism, and unrestrained nationalism. This ideological conglomerate disguised a struggle for power which ultimately led to the creation of a new Byzantinism in the form of the Third Reich.

Recent scholarship suggests, however, that the dismissal of ideology as the mere handmaiden of propaganda is misleading. Hans-Jochen Gamm (*Der Braune Kult*, 1962) and Wilfried Dim (*Der Mann, der Hitler die Ideen gab*, 1968), both of whom Bracher cites, interpret National Socialist ideology as an interlocking set of values sufficiently coherent to provide a means of legitimizing for many the regime and its policies. Gamm develops the mystical significance of National Socialist rituals and symbols, such as banners. Daim presents a view of National Socialism according to which the movement represented to its adherents the third stage (the first two having been a "paradise of racial purity" followed by an "age of racial degeneration") of a global historical process which would result in the triumph of a superior race. The eschatology of National Socialism justified the "Thousand-Year Reich" as the preparatory phase of the final battle between superior and inferior beings and made plain the essentially dialectical nature of Hitler's world view. Bracher appropriately directs our attention to a quotation from a speech Hitler gave in 1922:

There are . . . only two possibilities: either victory for the aryan side or its destruction and victory for the Jews.

Unfortunately, Bracher does not fully develop the ideological connotations of the concepts "aryan" and "Jew." The term "aryan" proved to be far broader than the word "German," and Bracher errs in suggesting that National Socialism was primarily an extreme form of German nationalism. Indeed, Hitler's goal was the elimination of the bourgeois state and its concomitant doctrine of nationalism (cf. E. Sandvoss, *Hitler und Nietzsche*, 1969). The "aryans" were to constitute an elite recruited from America, England, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries as well as Germany. And it is historically quite apparent that only a fraction of the German nation was regarded as being biologically eligible for membership in this new master race. George Stein (*The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War*, 1966) provides empirical evidence to the effect that "race" and "nation" were not identical in National Socialist ideology by pointing out that by 1945, German citizens were outnumbered in the regime's praetorian guard by foreigners and ethnic Germans from outside the *Reich*. There were, for example, 125,000 West Europeans alone in the Waffen SS: an im-

portant statistic when one considers that this organization was theoretically biologically superior to all other components of the movement and therefore given the task of fathering the future masters of the world. Himmler's 1940 directive ordering his followers to kidnap throughout occupied Europe children suitable for potential SS recruits leaves little doubt as to the transnational character of National Socialism, a factor which Bracher almost ignores. The "Jew," too, was a symbolic stereotype of a mythical enemy and not always a member of a specific religious community. Goering's boast that he would determine who is a Jew is representative of this attitude.

Perhaps one of the most difficult assertions of the book to accept is the presumed historical connection between the NSDAP and the NPD. Bracher correctly identifies three common characteristics of both parties: their reliance on the Protestant agrarian vote as a principal source of electoral strength, equally autocratic internal structure, and bias against the Left and any form of internationalism. Accordingly, Bracher warns that the National Democrats (NPD) could poison the democratic political life of the Federal Republic and recommends that the party be banned. In the *Land* elections of June 14, 1970, the NPD made its best showing with a total 3.3 per cent of the vote in Lower Saxony. Among those who lost their seats in the *Landtag* was the party leader, von Thadden. Under these circumstances the proposed outlawing of the NPD would be an exaggerated response to a group which has repeatedly failed to demonstrate its appeal to the West German electorate. That Bracher and other scholars rely upon legal sanctions of this type instead of expressing their faith in the common sense of the German voter in dealing with the NPD suggests a more serious questioning of German democracy than the existence of the party itself. Nevertheless, we are not so far removed from National Socialism as to be able to ignore with impunity any manifestations of its revival in a new historical context. It was undoubtedly both as a warning and an expression of hope for a future without tyranny that Bracher dedicated this work to his children.—JAMES H. WOLFE, *University of Maryland*.

Guerillas in Latin America. The Technique of the Counter-State. BY LUIS MERCIER VEGA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. Pp. 246. \$6.50.)

Originally published in France under the title *Technique Du Contre-Etat*, Mercier Vega summarizes the guerilla movements of recent years in Latin America. Part I, "Chemistry and Alchemy," deals with theoretical concepts, the ambiguous roles played by the Soviet Union and

China, and briefly considers the personal backgrounds of the guerilla fighters. Part II, "The National Situations," cites specific events and trends in guerilla activity in Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay, in that order. The last chapter of this Part refers in over-simplified brevity, to Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay. The latter is dismissed with a single sentence. Part III, "Documents," is at the same time boring with inconsequential details (the daily shifting of camp sites, burying of supplies, positioning of patrols, and inventory of captured weapons) and revealing of unexpected divisiveness and bitterness among leftist and Communist organizations. Among the documents reprinted—usually in attenuated form—are the diary of an Argentine insurgent, a War Ministry report by the Peruvian government, a Commission on Inquiry in Venezuela, a propaganda tract celebrating an attack by Colombians on a train, the text of the Venezuelan Communist party denunciation of Fidel Castro, and passages from Ché Guevara's booklet on guerilla warfare. Much of the volume's translation into English is by Daniel Weissbord, whose talents are less literary than literal. A necessary two-page List of Abbreviations helps somewhat in following the often tortuous course of splintered and mutually hostile revolutionary parties and "liberation" groups. The effect is that one reads bits and pieces of what is a wide-spread phenomenon affecting a dozen or more countries, with a great variation of ideological and regional implications.

Mercier Vega, a Chilean citizen, comes by his interest in, and knowledge of, guerilla tactics, honestly and pragmatically. He fought in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930's, and with the Free French forces in Africa and the Middle East during the 1940's. He also has radio and press reportage experiences of guerillas in other countries.

Altogether, the figures of Ché Guevara and of Fidel Castro, while receiving frequent mention in this slim volume, are far from dominating the Latin American revolutionary Left. Both in the chapters on theoretical concepts, and in the selection of diaries and documents, Mercier Vega makes it clear that several others aspired to national and regional leadership. There has obviously been much romanticizing of their own roles by the commanders of small bands of extremists, who time after time ran afoul of the orthodox Communist party command in their own country, and failed—as did Guevara in Bolivia—to attract support of either rural peasants or urban proletariat. Potentially of great interest, where new insights would have been of significance, the author's treatment of Russian and Chinese influence, is lacking in incisiveness or novelty. The Soviets feel that coexistence assures the consolidation of the

socialist camp; and "there are not sufficient grounds for concluding that a pro-Chinese apparatus on a continental scale exists." The author concludes that none of the armed movements corresponded to a theoretical scheme: "the attempts at subversion were much more of a case of classical political pressure, despair or adventurism, than of the application of the theories of the counter-state."—WILLARD F. BARBER, *University of Maryland*.

German Politics and the Spiegel Affair: A Case Study of the Bonn System. BY RONALD F. BUNN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968. Pp. 230. \$7.50.)

The Spiegel Affair. BY DAVID SCHOENBAUM. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968. Pp. 239. \$4.95.)

Die Spiegel-Affäre. ED. JÜRGEN SEIFERT. (Olten and Freiburg/Br.: Walter-Verlag, 1966.) Two volumes.

Vol. I: *Die Staatsmacht und ihre Kontrolle.* BY ALFRED GROSSER AND JÜRGEN SEIFERT. (Pp. 611. DM28.)

Vol. II: *Die Reaktion der Öffentlichkeit.* BY THOMAS ELLWEIN, MANFRED LIEBEL, AND INGE NEGT. (Pp. 522. DM28.)

The Spiegel affair resulted from a spectacular *faux pas* in the shadowy area of political justice and hastened the end of the Adenauer regime. The "night and fog" aspects of the dragnet police raids against personnel and offices of the independent news magazine and the conduct of leading members of the government in responding to public protest offended the sensibilities of important sections of the West German public. The forced resignation of Defense Minister Strauss was seen as a victory for a vigilant public opinion, reinforced by a strong echo from abroad, and as salutary evidence that the Bonn parliamentary system is responsive to public demands. But the criminal investigation and the excessive police action, which were based on an ill-founded suspicion of treason deriving from a Spiegel cover story on the Bundeswehr that attacked Strauss, pointed to weaknesses inherited from the past.

The affair raised basic issues of a strategic, institutional and legal nature, which barely reached the general public and were only gradually considered and resolved. The last implications from the Spiegel affair had not yet been drawn when these books were written from the perspective of the mid-1960's.

Their combined merit lies in pinpointing the issues and establishing the pattern of responsibility for the Spiegel action, which neither the government, parliament, the courts, nor even the opposition saw fit to clarify. The findings honor the late Otto Kirchheimer and Constantine Menges, for they confirm the soundness of their widely known

study of the Spiegel case in the Harbrace Casebook *Politics in Europe*, edited by Gwendolen Carter and Alan Westin.

For a comprehensive case history of the entire affair one must turn to Schoenbaum's unpretentious carefully researched book that was written for a wider audience. A trained historian who followed the affair on the spot as a free-lance reporter, Schoenbaum pays equal attention to issues and processes. Viewing the affair as "epilogue and overture at the same time," he offers insights into the personalities, institutional processes, and problems of the Bonn system as it gradually emancipated itself from the matrix of Allied tutelage and the conserving bonds of the Adenauer regime. Regrettably the publication omits most reference notes and lacks a bibliography and index.

Bunn's effort is narrower in scope and less successful. It focuses on selected phases of the political process during the six week crisis period, which commenced with the police raids against the Spiegel—at the height of the Cuban missile crisis—and ended with the reconstitution of a CDU-CSU-FDP cabinet, or the condition that Strauss be excluded and that Adenauer resign as Chancellor in less than a year.

The specialist can turn with profit to Seifert's collection of research studies, interpretative essays and source materials, which can be discussed here only in passing. In his own major research contribution, Seifert examines in a series of sharp analytical sketches the role of the public officials in the planning and execution of the police action and the subsequent covering up of the traces of responsibility. He shows that the personal complicity of Strauss and his State Secretary is much greater than was demonstrable while the affair ran its course. He also analyzes the role of the political parties in the counter-action that shook and then restored the government coalition. Grosser addresses himself to some of the basic questions raised by Seifert, moderating the latter's rather critical conclusions from the more detached vantage point of a foreign observer who judges the Bonn Republic in contrast to Weimar and modern France. A detailed chronology of the affair and a selection of key documents complete the first volume, taking up nearly two thirds of the space.

The second volume offers a thorough documentation and provocative analysis of the public reaction to the police action, the conduct of Strauss, and the government's inept and insensitive response to justified concern. Liebel contributes a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the domestic press and, more briefly, of other specialized publics—youth groups, writers and artists, university professors, the churches and trade unions—and the results of public opinion polls and the local elections in Hesse and Bavaria that occurred

during and affected the crisis. Negt examines the Spiegel affair in the mirror of the foreign press. Ellwein's interpretative essay picks up two related questions posed by Liebel. Viewed as a test case for the autonomous communication media, what conclusions can be drawn about (1) their commitment to the values of liberal democracy and (2) their influence on the decision-making political organs? Ellwein answers in a more differentiating manner than Liebel who concludes that (1) the press was only prepared to protect its self-interest and (2) the SPD and FDP would not have challenged the Spiegel action on their own. Ellwein concludes that in the Spiegel case the public performed its critical function and thereby enhanced the controllability of the government in general. A sample of press commentaries and public declarations by various groups completes this volume.

The trouble with Bunn's book is that the doubts regarding its purpose and approach, that surface in his preface and introduction, are justified. It gives the appearance of a collage of research fragments—two of which had been previously published—without a central theme, let alone an adequate theoretical framework. The author admits that he has slighted what he calls the "technical-legal features" of the affair and disclaims any intention of writing its case history. Yet the book contains material that would seem irrelevant to any other purpose. Bunn claims at one point that the study was "designed primarily to examine the functioning of the West German political system as it sought to respond to and resolve the crisis produced by the affair." It attempts more and achieves less.

More than half of the book describes the affair's background and origin. The public reaction was keyed to the impassioned crusade which the Spiegel had led for over two years against Strauss with the avowed aim to block his ascent to the Chancellorship. Bunn shows that the political system did more than respond to the crisis; it helped create it. Without the intervention of the communication media and the political parties there could not have been a major political affair. On account of the high level of public awareness and the involvement of most of the primary institutions and personalities, the crisis period lends itself to a systematic analysis of the Bonn system's styles, procedures, and power differentials. Bunn attempts this only in part and hesitates to draw conclusions. Some processes are overlooked, others barely noted. For example, a full chapter exploits a previously published analysis of a limited sample of newspaper clippings for the purpose of discussing the role of the press in framing the issues and articulating the protests of other organized publics immediately after the initial police raids. The subsequent role of the communication media in intensifying the crisis is virtually ignored. Liebel dem-

onstrates that a large segment of the press abandoned its initial reserve only after Strauss' previously denied involvement had been partially unveiled at the end of a series of parliamentary question hours.

Of all the actors, only the FDP receives the benefit of sustained analysis. For Bunn seems convinced that it alone was in a position to resolve the crisis of confidence by enforcing the principle of ministerial responsibility against Strauss through its temporary withdrawal from the government. He clearly shows the ambivalence of the FDP leadership, then headed by Mende, as it was driven by the pressure of events to play its promised role as the liberal corrective against the abuse of power in a bourgeois coalition. One might wish that Bunn had paid even more attention to the internal processes and the parliamentary role of the FDP, to the exclusion of other concerns, for it is here that the book contributes to our understanding of West German politics.

Bunn cautiously suggests that the FDP's "third force rationale is not entirely irrelevant to the Bonn system." But he fails to contemplate the possible consequences, if the affair had occurred two years earlier when the CDU/CSU possessed an absolute parliamentary majority, or to discuss the implications of the trend towards a two-party system. It could be argued that the presence of a parliamentary third force merely affects the style of settling conflicts without altering a political system's capabilities.

Bunn concludes with a catalogue of institutional strengths and weaknesses, but one is left to wonder about the nature and viability of the Bonn system. He praises the control function of an independent press, the SPD opposition, and the FDP coalition partner. He notes the efficacy of the parliamentary question hour as a control instrument in exceptional situations. He also identifies two flaws which have been since corrected: (1) the automaticity of criminal prosecutions under the "legality principle" in cases of political justice; (2) the practice of assigning State Secretaries as watchdogs on Ministers of the coalition partner. But, on the whole, his presentation leaves the impression that the origin of the affair, as well as its resolution, were the accidental product of circumstance and personality.

Schoenbaum attaches greater significance to the largely autonomous role of the federal prosecutors and the judiciary. Apart from the encouragement and direction it received from Strauss and his State Secretary who presumed to act on behalf of Adenauer, the Spiegel action was the product of anachronistic law, inadequate procedures, and poor judgment on the part of a state bureaucracy that uncritically accepted the judgment of constituted authority and frowned on those who questioned it.

Ultimately the affair posed the key issue—later explored before the Federal Constitutional Court—where, and by whom, the line is to be drawn in concrete cases that might involve a confrontation between the right to inform and criticize, as a correlate of public control of military policy, and the duty to protect secrecy, as a correlate of national security.

Schoenbaum explores the origin and the implications of the incriminating cover story that attacked Strauss' strategic conception, divulged the Bundeswehr's inadequate performance in the recent Fallex-62 NATO maneuvers, attributed this to Strauss' faulty planning, and suggested that Strauss' atomic ambitions were being opposed not only by Bonn's alliance partners but from within the Defense Ministry. A full English translation of the story is appended to Bunn's book, which offers a brief summary but otherwise avoids the problem.

The purpose of the police action was to secure evidence in support of the charge that alleged state secrets in the cover story had been procured by the Spiegel from as yet unknown sources in the Defense Ministry. Military publicists in the West found nothing that jeopardized NATO security and little that had not been previously published elsewhere. A month-long search of the Spiegel offices and archives failed to uncover the vast conspiracy of treason and even high treason that Strauss and Adenauer imagined and the federal prosecutors thought possible. It merely netted a Bundeswehr colonel who had contacted the Spiegel out of concern over Strauss' preference for a pre-emptive atomic strike strategy at a time when the Kennedy administration switched to a strategy of graduated deterrence. The federal prosecutors' efforts to vindicate themselves through convictions failed to bring a single defendant to a formal trial. If trials had been held under the existing law, which derived its pedigree from the Bismarck era, they might have led to politically inopportune convictions and a miscarriage of justice. The last cases were dismissed for insufficient evidence in 1965. Three years later the law was liberalized under the guidance of Justice Minister Heinemann, formerly an attorney for the Spiegel.

All authors agree on the culpability of Strauss. Grosser allows that if Strauss had resorted to half-truths and untruths for reasons of state it would have been excusable. That he lied to the public and parliament mainly for personal advantage rendered his conduct morally objectionable and his continuance in office politically untenable. Here the parallel to the Profumo affair that rocked the Macmillan government one year later

ends, for Strauss was able to recapture ministerial honors. As long as he remains the undisputed leader of the CSU, he will be a potent national figure on account of the constellation of Bonn politics. Bunn and Schoenbaum describe the bargaining reality of a parliamentary four-party system throughout the government crisis. We still lack sufficient knowledge about the internal structure of the CSU to be able to explain the phenomenon of Strauss, but it seems clear that the Bavarian electorate's failure to punish the CSU at the height of the Spiegel crisis actually strengthened his leadership. Since the CDU and CSU are Siamese twins with separate identities and inseparable bodies, the CSU—and consequently Strauss—were bound to exercise a disproportionate amount of influence. This could not be changed as long as a SPD-FDP governing coalition was impossible or impracticable for arithmetical and attitudinal reasons.

Taking the long view, Schoenbaum suggests that the Spiegel affair, not unlike the Dreyfus affair in the Third Republic, may be seen as a turning point in the evolution of the Bonn Republic. From the perspective of the mid-1960's—as Strauss was returned to the cabinet under the aegis of a great coalition which in the eyes of many intellectuals signaled the atrophy of responsible government and the malaise of social stagnation—most of the other authors share the then fashionable view that the Spiegel affair temporarily disturbed the system without changing its premises. They underrate the affair's demonstration effect tied to rapid generational change—in our post-industrial society a question of as little as five or ten years. Their own accounts show that the affair brought out stylistic predispositions and substantive concerns that challenged established patterns. The government's authoritarian demeanor as well as the efficacy of political protest had a profound effect on several attentive publics, especially among the young whose political consciousness was formed under the Bonn System. The methodological problems standing in the way of measuring demonstration effects need not keep one from postulating more or less direct connections between the Spiegel affair and each of the following: the rise of an extra-parliamentary opposition, the modification of the proposed state of emergency legislation, the liberalization of the criminal code and judicial practice in the whole area of political justice, the formation of a social-liberal SPD-FDP coalition, and major changes in Bonn's foreign and military policy along lines propagated by the Spiegel for more than a decade.—CHARLES R. NAEF, *Colgate University*.