opera librettos and established the first girls' gymnasium in 1890, or Paulina Kuczalska-Reinschmit, who sought to connect Poles to the international woman's movement and organized a covert branch of the Alliance universelle des femmes under the name Unia in the last decades of the century. While the authors often stress the ways this history is ignored within their national historiography, the essays on Norwegian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Greek history all suggest how writing women and gender back into political history might change our understanding of nationalist movements. Varikas's fine essay is the most attentive to the ways gender ideologies structured Greek nationalism allowing a space for women's activities but also imposing limits on their discourse. Mary Nash, by contrast, argues that authoritarian Spanish political culture in the nineteenth century led women to adopt emancipation strategies that were disconnected from political rights. Women such as Concepción Arenal emerged from a gender culture shaped by domesticity and based their claims for women's education on gender difference rather than equality.

Many essays address the rhetoric of women's feminist claims: equality versus difference, individual versus relational, and even ethical versus rational (the terms of the debate in nineteenth-century Netherlands). For some this rhetoric has proved conceptually useful: Ute Gerhard argues that it allowed historians of Germany to discover the significance of social or spiritual motherhood, but she also highlights the class basis of this rhetoric that flourished within a state with strong anti-individualist leanings. The strong concluding essays by Christina Bolt, which compares British and American feminism, and by Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker suggest, however, that these dichotomies have spent their conceptual force. Like the debates about the public and private sphere, recent studies have shown that the same feminists could speak about women's special duties to defend better education, while also arguing for women's individual rights. The strength of this collection lies in its effort to change our historical understanding of political and national histories, suggesting, as the editors argue, that organized women's movements did indeed play an essential role "in the process of social and cultural modernization" (p. 332).

The juxtaposition of national studies also highlights the usefulness of thinking about women's political cultures (Jane Rendall on Britain) or feminist cultures (Florence Rochefort on France) and on how these cultures contributed to the emergence of a transnational feminist movement, mention of which appears like a tantalizing thread in a number of the essays. As a historian of education, I was struck that efforts to improve women's education constituted the essential first step for most of these women who generally came from the educated urban middle classes. Somewhat surprisingly, religion figures far less prominently in these essays than readers familiar with American or British feminism might expect, although this may in part be the result of the countries under examination. The story would probably change with the inclusion of Catholic Ireland, Italy, and Austria. Ultimately, however, historians interested in comparative studies would do well to heed Mineke Bosch's epilogue to her study of the Netherlands, where she suggests that rather than looking for universal truths and generalizations, comparisons should be guided by synthetic themes like state and empire building, or constructions of citizenship. Comparison in the end should be about "real international exchange . . . to promote mutual understanding" (p. 76). This collection is an important first step.

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DAVID I. KERTZER and MARZIO BARBAGLI, editors. *Family Life in the Twentieth Century.* (The History of the European Family, volume 3.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 2003. Pp. xliv, 450. $40.00.

The first two volumes in this ambitious project on the history of the European family concluded that between 1500 and 1800 there was a tendency toward divergence in most aspects of family life; the second, on the nineteenth century, saw evidence of both divergence and convergence; but in this volume on the twentieth century, editors David I. Kertzer and Marzio Barbagli are of the view that the essays point mainly toward convergence in terms of household composition, reproductive behavior, the domestic division of labor, and the distribution of power within households. Nevertheless, at the end of the century there remained substantial differences in fertility, and convergence in marriage patterns has been both less dramatic and less unilinear.

The book provides a good overview of these central demographic shifts, and is to be praised for the way in which it integrates material from Eastern as well as Northern and Southern Europe. It also covers the politics of the family at key political moments in the twentieth century, changes in family law and policy, and, much more briefly, the history of the family home and some dimensions of family relationships. Most of the chapters have an enormous brief and it is in fact difficult for authors to tease out the complicated nesting of divergent and convergent trends. For example, it is certainly the case that most European countries have experienced changes in female employment, but the aggregate female labor market participation rates presented in this book do not get us very far. It may be that there is some convergence toward a part-time norm, Central and East European countries included, but then again the actual hours worked and the conditions of that part-time employment differ hugely among countries. Sometimes I wished for more concentration on explaining the position of countries where important indicators have been persistently at odds with those of their neighbors. In Portugal, for

example, women have had historically high labor market participation rates and the "illegitimacy rate" has also been high for a southern European country.

The pace of family change has been much greater in the last quarter of the twentieth century than before, but again there is relatively little attention paid to this. However, it is refreshing to have a long historical view of continuity and change, particularly by Theo Engelen in his more detailed exploration of the demographics and his interesting comments on the debate over the existence of a "second demographic transition."

Inevitably in such a volume, authors can often do little more than provide a thick comparative description of their topic, drawing attention to a few crucial themes. Chiara Saraceno rightly highlights the importance of assumptions about the existence and desirability of a male breadwinner model family underpinning much of family policy until the 1970s, followed by increasing family and labor market instability, which, together with the crisis in welfare states during the 1990s, has resulted in a very different approach to social and family policies. But some of the most interesting issues lie at the interstices of the chapters: for example, between family law and policy. Paola Ronfani refers to the complicated trend in family law that appears at first blush to be a form of deregulation, but that in fact amounts to states stepping back and trying to ensure that parents (rather than husbands and wives) take responsibility for their children. Increasing individualization alongside the continuing concern to enforce the traditional responsibilities of families to care for young and old dependants has resulted in the reworking of relationships among the individual, the family, and the state (touched on by Paul Ginsborg in this volume), and among families, labor markets, and states.

Perhaps above all the dramatic nature of family change, particularly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, has raised the issue of what happens to care in families. Martine Segalen has her eye on this important issue when she asks whether family change has resulted in more or fewer effective kinship ties. This is difficult to investigate historically, but given the huge importance of the family in providing nurture and "welfare" in the largest sense, it is worthy of further investigation.

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ATHANASIOS LYKOGIANNIS. *Britain and the Greek Economic Crisis 1944–1947: From Liberation to the Truman Doctrine*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 287. $39.95.

The German occupation of Greece during World War II cost the Greeks 520,000 lives (over half from food shortages) and approximately three-fourths of their merchant fleet tonnage. Printing drachmae to meet current expenditures, Greek regimes increased the rate of circulation of their currency by a factor of 826 million. In the aftermath of liberation from the devastation of war, the National Unity Government confronted the extraordinarily difficult problem of trying to rein in hyperinflation and effect economic stabilization.

Athanasios Lykogiannis's careful analysis of efforts to address these problems in the period 1944–1947 is based on archival research in Greece, Great Britain, and the United States and goes a long way, in my judgment, toward providing a more balanced view than offered heretofore of the difficulties Greek governments confronted and the reasons why they were unsuccessful. The author argues that the enormity of the task required a break from the past: reform of a tax structure that was incapable of satisfying the needs of a modern state; determination by competing networks of personal allegiances not to indulge in rivalries over political patronage, for which the overblown state payroll was a channel; a decision to use foreign loans to lay the basis for future prosperity, not for covering current deficits; and a willingness on the part of Greek governments to heed what Lykogiannis sees as sound advice, based on Britain's experience at home and abroad during World War II.

With the exception of the "Varvaressos Experiment" in 1945, no Greek government during this period put forward a coherent program. All governments, moreover, were burdened by a political, economic, and social history that made it difficult for them to attract public support and deal with postliberation realities. Lykogiannis makes the case that the Axis occupation may have caused hyperinflation, but that progress in the early postliberation period was limited primarily by the legacy of the past as well as by the ineptness of successive Greek governments that were hostile toward economic management and unreceptive to orthodox economic advice. Contrary to many authors who have written on this question—Lykogiannis conducts a debate with at least ten of them in the course of his thoughtful assessments—he does not blame foreign intervention (the traditional scapegoat) for Greece's plight. Great Britain and the United States (in the period from 1947 on) come in for considerable criticism on a number of fronts (e.g. U.S. policy was overbearingly self-righteous, obsessed with the communist threat, and tacitly tolerant of human rights abuses); but the author, noting that the U.S. is often condemned as being "both too laissez-faire and too interventionist" (p. 248), puts the responsibility for prolonging Greece's difficulties primarily on Greece's history and its own governments.

In Lykogiannis's judgment, it was the Greek governments themselves that avoided what he sees as the only feasible long-term means to fight inflation: sound public finances; suitable taxation; supervision of imports, wages, and prices. Lacking a tradition, a mentality, and a consensus required to accept state economic management as practiced in the West, not to mention the machinery to administer and enforce it, governments pursued alternative solutions such as